Agentic Cloud Decoys: A Deception-Driven Framework for Autonomous Intrusion Investigation

attacker chosen values providers record verbatim, which makes any log to prompt path an indirect prompt injection channel that a decoy widens rather than narrows. We address the first

SafeClawBench: Separating Semantic, Audit-Evidence, and Sandbox Harm in Tool-Using LLM Agents

agent security with 600 controlled adversarial tasks across six attack families: direct and indirect prompt injection, tool-return injection, memory poisoning, memory extraction, and ambiguity-driven unsafe inference. SafeClawBench reports

MobileWorldSafety: Benchmarking GUI Agent Safety Against Environmental Injection Attacks in Android Apps

untrusted environmental content, they are highly vulnerable to environmental injection attacks, which include indirect prompt injections and adversarial instructions. Such attacks can manipulate the behavior of agents without user awareness

MCP Atlassian: Path Traversal / Arbitrary File Read in confluence_upload

CIBER: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Security Evaluation of Code Interpreter Agents

vulnerability of code interpreter agents against four major types of adversarial attacks: Direct/Indirect Prompt Injection, Memory Poisoning, and Prompt-based Backdoor. We evaluate six foundation models across two representative code

Boundary-Aware Test-Time Adaptation for Zero-Shot Medical Image Segmentation

test-time adaptation. This framework integrates two key mechanisms: (1) The encoder-level Gaussian prompt injection embeds Gaussian-based prompts directly into the image encoder, providing explicit guidance for initial

Prompt Attack Detection with LLM-as-a-Judge and Mixture-of-Models

Prompt attacks, including jailbreaks and prompt injections, pose a critical security risk to Large Language Model (LLM) systems. In production, guardrails must mitigate these attacks under strict low-latency constraints

Open WebUI has Knowledge Base Destruction and RAG Poisoning via

Langchain SQL Injection vulnerability

Langroid: SQLChatAgent _validate_query blocklist misses pg_read_file family

MIRROR: Novelty-Constrained Memory-Guided MCTS Red-Teaming for Agentic RAG

Multimodal agentic retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems expand the attack surface beyond prompt injection to include text poisoning, image injection, direct-query attacks, and orchestrator-level tool manipulation. Existing

From versions 0.3.79 and prior and 1.0.0 to 1.0.6, a template injection vulnerability exists in LangChain's prompt template system that allows attackers to access Python object internals through template

AgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers

Paraphrasing Adversarial Attack on LLM-as-a-Reviewer

growing attention, making it essential to examine their potential vulnerabilities. Prior attacks rely on prompt injection, which alters manuscript content and conflates injection susceptibility with evaluation robustness. We propose

What Matters For Safety Alignment?

services, highlighting an urgent need for architectural and deployment safeguards. Fourth, roleplay, prompt injection, and gradient-based search for adversarial prompts are the predominant methodologies for eliciting unaligned behaviors

PromptScreen: Efficient Jailbreak Mitigation Using Semantic Linear Classification in a Multi-Staged Pipeline

Prompt injection and jailbreaking attacks pose persistent security challenges to large language model (LLM)-based systems. We present PromptScreen, an efficient and systematically evaluated defense architecture that mitigates these threats

Penetration Testing of Agentic AI: A Comparative Security Analysis Across Models and Frameworks

functionality of a university information management system and 13 distinct attack scenarios that span prompt injection, Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF), SQL injection, and tool misuse. Our 130 total test

The Target Agent Is Its Own Best Critic but a Poor Proposer: Self-Improved Red Teaming

large language models (LLMs) to iteratively diagnose failed attacks and propose improved adversarial prompts or injections. Although prior work strengthens this loop through prompt engineering and search-harness design

GhostEI-Bench: Do Mobile Agents Resilience to Environmental Injection in Dynamic On-Device Environments?

inter-app interactions, exposes them to a unique and underexplored threat vector: environmental injection. Unlike prompt-based attacks that manipulate textual instructions, environmental injection corrupts an agent's visual perception

Trojan's Whisper: Stealthy Manipulation of OpenClaw through Injected Bootstrapped Guidance

stealthy attack vector that embeds adversarial operational narratives into bootstrap guidance files. Unlike traditional prompt injection, which relies on explicit malicious instructions, guidance injection manipulates the agent's reasoning context