AgentTypo: Adaptive Typographic Prompt Injection Attacks against Black-box Multimodal Agents

models (LVLMs) are increasingly deployed in open-world settings but remain highly vulnerable to prompt injection, especially through visual inputs. We introduce AgentTypo, a black-box red-teaming framework that

Learning to Inject: Automated Prompt Injection via Reinforcement Learning

Prompt injection is one of the most critical vulnerabilities in LLM agents; yet, effective automated attacks remain largely unexplored from an optimization perspective. Existing methods heavily depend on human

Are You Reading the Right Thing? Rethinking Internal Signals for Prompt-Injection Detection

common structured indirect prompt-injection setup on Qwen3.6-35B-A3B and Gemma-4-26B-A4B-it. We evaluate each method by how well it distinguishes injected prompts from benign controls

Zero-Shot Embedding Drift Detection: A Lightweight Defense Against Prompt Injections in LLMs

manipulations inherent to real-world injection attacks. To ensure robust evaluation, we assemble and re-annotate the comprehensive LLMail-Inject dataset spanning five injection categories derived from publicly available sources

"Give a Positive Review Only": An Early Investigation Into In-Paper Prompt Injection Attacks and Defenses for AI Reviewers

reviewing scientific papers. However, recent reports have revealed that some papers contain hidden, injected prompts designed to manipulate AI reviewers into providing overly favorable evaluations. In this work, we present

The Mirror Design Pattern: Strict Data Geometry over Model Scale for Prompt Injection Detection

Prompt injection defenses are often framed as semantic understanding problems and delegated to increasingly large neural detectors. For the first screening layer, however, the requirements are different: the detector runs

MPIB: A Benchmark for Medical Prompt Injection Attacks and Clinical Safety in LLMs

LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are increasingly integrated into clinical workflows; however, prompt injection attacks can steer these systems toward clinically unsafe or misleading outputs. We introduce

Agent Against Agent: An Agentic System for Automatic Prompt Injection Red Teaming

Prompt injection poses significant security risks to LLM agents. Efficient and effective red-teaming is therefore critical, both for evaluating these risks and for collecting training data to improve defenses

PraisonAI Vulnerable to OS Command Injection

When AI Meets the Web: Prompt Injection Risks in Third-Party AI Chatbot Plugins

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), with prior work focusing on cutting-edge LLM applications like personal copilots. In contrast, simpler LLM applications, such

Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks Against Application Using Classifiers

networks, Random Forest, and Naive Bayes, to detect malicious prompts in LLM integrated web applications. The proposed approach improves prompt injection detection and mitigation, helping protect targeted applications and systems

Assessing Automated Prompt Injection Attacks in Agentic Environments

Indirect prompt injection poses a critical threat to LLM agents that interact with untrusted external data, yet automated attack methods--proven effective for jailbreaking--remain underexplored in realistic agentic settings

PraisonAI before 4.6.78 contains a prompt injection defense bypass vulnerability where the injection defense only blocks threats classified as CRITICAL, requiring three or more detector families to match simultaneously. Attackers

WAInjectBench: Benchmarking Prompt Injection Detections for Web Agents

Multiple prompt injection attacks have been proposed against web agents. At the same time, various methods have been developed to detect general prompt injection attacks, but none have been systematically

SecInfer: Preventing Prompt Injection via Inference-time Scaling

Prompt injection attacks pose a pervasive threat to the security of Large Language Models (LLMs). State-of-the-art prevention-based defenses typically rely on fine-tuning

COPA: Continual Preference Optimization for Adaptive Prompt Injection Defense

LLMs remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in user inputs or external content manipulate model behavior and bypass safeguards. Existing defenses are predominantly static, relying

Universal Defenses for Tool-Integrated LLM Agents Against Adversarial Attacks

multi-step task completion. However, they are increasingly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, including direct prompt injection, indirect prompt injection, memory poisoning, and backdoor attacks, which exploit the model's openness

PraisonAI MCP `tools/call` path-traversal => RCE via Python `.pth` injection

CoRL: Co-Evolutionary Reinforcement Learning for Adaptive Indirect Prompt-Injection Attacks and Defenses

Tool-augmented language agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI). Unlike direct prompt injection, IPI hides adversarial instructions in untrusted tool outputs and can covertly alter the execution

A Systematic Literature Review on LLM Defenses Against Prompt Injection and Jailbreaking: Expanding NIST Taxonomy

emergence of new security vulnerabilities and challenges, such as jailbreaking and other prompt injection attacks. These maliciously crafted inputs can exploit LLMs, causing data leaks, unauthorized actions, or compromised outputs