773 results in 218ms
Paper2602.01378v1

Context Dependence and Reliability in Autoregressive Language Models

unpredictable shifts in attribution scores, undermining interpretability and raising concerns about risks like prompt injection. This work addresses the challenge of distinguishing essential context elements from correlated ones. We introduce

medium relevanceattack
Paper2511.23174v1

Are LLMs Good Safety Agents or a Propaganda Engine?

approaches (erasing the concept of politics); and, 2) vulnerability of models on PSP through prompt injection attacks (PIAs). Associating censorship with refusals on content with masked implicit intent, we find

medium relevancedefense
Paper2603.11853v1

OpenClaw PRISM: A Zero-Fork, Defense-in-Depth Runtime Security Layer for Tool-Augmented LLM Agents

augmented LLM agents introduce security risks that extend beyond user-input filtering, including indirect prompt injection through fetched content, unsafe tool execution, credential leakage, and tampering with local control files

medium relevancetool
Paper2609.01677v1

Skill-as-API: Confidential Multi-Agent Coordination for Agentic Software Engineering

process and never crosses the wire. Four layers add access control and narrow the prompt-injection surface structurally rather than by filtering content. We provide an open-source Python implementation

medium relevancesurvey
Paper2603.01574v1

DualSentinel: A Lightweight Framework for Detecting Targeted Attacks in Black-box LLM via Dual Entropy Lull Pattern

APIs, but their trustworthiness may be critically undermined by targeted attacks like backdoor and prompt injection attacks, which secretly force LLMs to generate specific malicious sequences. Existing defensive approaches

high relevancetool
Paper2610.26013v1

SpanGuard: Decoupling Instruction Localization from Authorization for Lightweight IPI Defense

based guardrails are effective against indirect prompt injection (IPI), but their performance depends heavily on model capability: as the guardrail model becomes smaller or weaker, detection degrades substantially. This raises

medium relevancedefense

DeepSeek TUI has SSRF via HTTP Redirect Bypass in fetch

CVSS7.4deepseek-tuiView details
Paper2604.19657v1

An AI Agent Execution Environment to Safeguard User Data

serious risk to security and privacy. Adversaries may attack the AI model (e.g., via prompt injection) to exfiltrate user data. Furthermore, sharing private data with an AI agent requires users

medium relevancebenchmark
Paper2611.04879v2

ScamWorld: An Interactive Environment for Evaluating Web Agents Against Online Fraud

users. Prior work has shown that they can be misled by adversarial content, including prompt injections and deceptive interfaces. Beyond such attacks, agents operating on the open web also encounter

medium relevancebenchmark
Paper2611.04879v1

ScamWorld: An Interactive Environment for Evaluating Web Agents Against Online Fraud

users. Prior work has shown that they can be misled by adversarial content, including prompt injections and deceptive interfaces. Beyond such attacks, agents operating on the open web also encounter

medium relevancebenchmark
Paper2611.04271v1

From Guidelines to Practice: Defining Requirements for AI Red-Teaming Tools

However, AI also introduces additional attack surfaces for threat actors to perform attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking, making security a great concern. AI security testing aims to imitate adversarial

high relevancetool
Paper2611.02741v1

ATrust: Adaptive Trust Boundary Expansion for Securing LLM Agents

require complex exploitation of operating system vulnerabilities, attackers can easily hijack agents through indirect prompt injection (IPI), leading to privacy leakage, financial loss, and destructive operations. However, existing defenses often

medium relevanceattack
Paper2611.02611v1

Where Does MCP Security End? A Three-Tier Mitigation Mapping Framework for the OWASP MCP Top 10

control planes into a single natural language channel. This introduces confused deputy and prompt injection vulnerabilities that cannot be completely mitigated in the software development lifecycle (SDLC

medium relevancetool
Paper2611.02484v1

Benchmark of THReD: Evaluating an LLM Agent and Its Preprocessing Tools for Turning Electronic Health Records into AI-Ready Datasets

including goal-level requests, failure recovery, requests calling for no action, schema variation and prompt injection through the data, on synthetic tables calibrated to a regional health information exchange; success

medium relevancebenchmark
Paper2611.02332v1

LEANGUARD: Lean-Verified Guardrails for Tool-Using Agents

none; with feedback, task success does not change significantly. On DTap, LeanGuard reduces direct prompt-injection success from 57.9% to 5.9%, and in telecom, where benign tasks need no writes

medium relevancetool
Paper2611.01976v1

Beyond Prompt Injection: The Tool Update Gap in LLM Agent Security

Large language model based agents increasingly rely on external tools

high relevancetool
Paper2610.40396v1

Understanding and Mitigating Role Spoofing in LLMs

Despite growing capabilities, LLMs remain susceptible to prompt injections: malicious inputs that can manipulate or hijack models. In particular, it has recently been observed that LLMs can exhibit role confusion

medium relevanceattack
Paper2610.39155v1

REALM: Identifying Minimal Task Assets for LLM Agents

agents often receive access to more files, accounts, and services than a task requires. Prompt injection turns this excess access into an opportunity to redirect execution toward unrelated resources. Applying

medium relevanceattack
Paper2610.39109v1

PCM: A Proof-Carrying Message Protocol for Verifiable Multi-Agent Communication

authenticate the channel, but the sender is the party in doubt, so a prompt-injected agent can launder fabricated facts and authority through a multi-agent system. We present Proof

low relevancebenchmark
Paper2610.38895v1

FlipJev: Fast Black-Box Red Teaming Finds Universal Adversarial Suffixes for Typed Decision Models

with different data types and application scenarios. The results show that Jev resists common prompt injections: no strategy changes a correct answer in 10,240 paired tests. In contrast

high relevanceattack
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