PraisonAI: Arbitrary File Read via `@file:` Mention Path Traversal
AULLM++: Structural Reasoning with Large Language Models for Micro-Expression Recognition
propose AULLM++, a reasoning-oriented framework leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs), which injects visual features into textual prompts as actionable semantic premises to guide inference. It formulates AU prediction into
Structural Role Injection in Handlebars-Templated LLM Prompts: Triple-Brace Interpolation, Delimiter Family, and the Limits of HTML Auto-Escaping
Large language model applications build prompts from templates, and Handlebars is a widely used templating engine and the default prompt-template format in Microsoft Semantic Kernel. Its double-brace
BadTemplate: A Training-Free Backdoor Attack via Chat Template Against Large Language Models
chat templates allows an attacker who controls the template to inject arbitrary strings into the system prompt without the user's notice. Building on this, we propose a training-free
Stealthy Backdoor Attacks against LLMs Based on Natural Style Triggers
attack in a realistic threat model and systematically evaluate BadStyle under both prompt-induced and PEFT-based injection strategies. Extensive experiments across seven victim LLMs, including LLaMA, Phi, DeepSeek
Black-Box Skill Stealing Attack from Proprietary LLM Agents: An Empirical Study
prior prompt-stealing methods and build an automated stealing prompt generation agent. This agent starts from model-generated seed prompts, expands them through scenario rationalization and structure injection, and enforces
Text Prompter – Unlimited chatgpt text prompts for openai tasks plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the plugin's 'text_prompter' shortcode in all versions
Multi-Turn Jailbreaking of Aligned LLMs via Lexical Anchor Tree Search
injection. LATS reformulates jailbreaking as a breadth-first tree search over multi-turn dialogues, where each node incrementally injects missing content words from the attack goal into benign prompts. Evaluations
Flowise: Parameter Override Bypass Remote Command Execution
CoT-Guard: Small Models for Strong Monitoring
attacks, where the adversary is a third-party LLM router injecting hidden objectives into code-generation requests through either prompt manipulation or code manipulation attacks. To push beyond objectives that
files, which leads to a server side template injection vulnerability within langchaingo, allowing an attacker to insert a statement into a prompt to read the "etc/passwd" file
Generate "Normal", Edit Poisoned: Branding Injection via Hint Embedding in Image Editing
rendered onto semantically related objects, even when the user prompt does not explicitly mention it. This form of hidden payload injection makes the attack stealthy. We study two realistic attack
Open WebUI: Cross-user file disclosure via /api/chat/completions image_url
vLLM Vulnerable to Remote DoS via Special-Token Placeholders
Synthetic Voices, Real Threats: Evaluating Large Text-to-Speech Models in Generating Harmful Audio
second leverages audio-modality exploits (Read, Spell, Phoneme) that inject harmful content through auxiliary audio channels while maintaining benign textual prompts. Through evaluation across five commercial LALMs-based TTS systems
Evaluating Adversarial Vulnerabilities in Modern Large Language Models
prompted to circumvent their own safety protocols, and 'cross-bypass', where one model generated adversarial prompts to exploit vulnerabilities in the other. Four attack methods were employed - direct injection, role
MemVenom: Triggered Poisoning of Multimodal Memories in Web Agents
induction that leverages adversarial perturbations and stealthy OCR injection to override the original user objective. Unlike prior attacks that operate on prompts or text-only memory, our approach enables persistent
Large Language Models for Detecting Cyberattacks on Smart Grid Protective Relays
perfect fault detection accuracy. Additional evaluations demonstrate robustness to prompt formulation variations, resilience under combined time-synchronization and false-data injection attacks, and stable performance under realistic measurement noise levels