455 results in 159ms
Paper2606.23362v1

TooBad: Backdoor Diffusion Models with Ultra-Low Poison Rate and Imperceptible Trigger

factors: attack performance, stealthiness, time complexity, and required poison rates. For example, achieving high attack performance typically demands a high poison rate and prolonged training, which undermines stealthiness, making

medium relevancebenchmark
Paper2601.01972v3

Hidden State Poisoning Attacks against Mamba-based Language Models

their hidden states, referred to as a Hidden State Poisoning Attack (HiSPA). Our benchmark RoBench25 allows evaluating a model's information retrieval capabilities when subject to HiSPAs, and confirms

high relevanceattack
Paper2511.14301v3

SteganoBackdoor: Stealthy and Data-Efficient Backdoor Attacks on Language Models

Modern language models remain vulnerable to backdoor attacks via poisoned data, where training inputs containing a trigger are paired with a target output, causing the model to reproduce that behavior

high relevanceattack
Paper2605.02110v1

Adversarial Update-Based Federated Unlearning for Poisoned Model Recovery

Federated learning (FL) is vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious clients upload manipulated updates to degrade the performance of the global model. Although detection methods can identify and remove malicious

medium relevanceattack
Paper2606.05958v1

Steering Vectors are an Adversarial Attack Surface

verify. We test the attack on two open-weight model families and eight model-attribute combinations, observing that poisoned vectors reach an absolute attack success rate

high relevanceattack
Paper2509.23041v2

Virus Infection Attack on LLMs: Your Poisoning Can Spread "VIA" Synthetic Data

data poisoning and backdoor attacks show that VIA significantly increases the presence of poisoning content in synthetic data and correspondingly raises the attack success rate (ASR) on downstream models

high relevanceattack
Paper2511.02894v3

Adaptive and Robust Data Poisoning Detection and Sanitization in Wearable IoT Systems using Large Language Models

environments. This work proposes a novel framework that uses large language models (LLMs) to perform poisoning detection and sanitization in HAR systems, utilizing zero-shot, one-shot, and few-shot

medium relevanceattack
Paper2605.19227v1

Token by Token, Compromised: Backdoor Vulnerabilities in Unified Autoregressive Models

model in which a subtle word (e.g., ``cool'') induces modality-aligned brand promotion or ideological influence in 55% of generations. Without model access, ToBAC can be induced through data poisoning

medium relevanceattack
Paper2601.01972v4

Hidden State Poisoning Attacks against Mamba-based Language Models

their hidden states, referred to as a Hidden State Poisoning Attack (HiSPA). Our benchmark RoBench-25 allows evaluating a model's information retrieval capabilities when subject to HiSPAs, and confirms

high relevanceattack
Paper2610.18609v1

DPOison-VL: Clean Preference Poisoning in Vision-Language Direct Preference Optimization

demonstrate that DPOison-VL achieves up to 98\% ASR with only 2\% poisoned data and exhibits cross-model transferability, while largely preserving clean accuracy and general utility. Our findings reveal

medium relevanceattack
Paper2611.03555v1

MCP Tool Poisoning in Agentic AI Frameworks: A Cross-Framework Measurement Study

models to external tool providers, but it carries attacker-controlled content (tool descriptions, schema fields, and response data) into model context without validation. Prior benchmarks measure model compliance with poisoned

medium relevancetool
Paper2609.09564v1

Robust Industrial Cyber Physical Classification Using Neuromorphic Temporal Embeddings and Hybrid SNN XGBoost Under Machine Unlearning Attacks

loses only 0.9\% F1-macro at 10\% poisoning and delays target-class collapse from 60\% to 70\% poisoning compared with raw models. These results demonstrate that neuromorphic temporal encoding

high relevanceattack
Paper2605.11592v1

SoK: Unlearnability and Unlearning for Model Dememorization

Advanced model dememorization methods, including availability poisoning (unlearnability) and machine unlearning, are emerging as key safeguards against data misuse in machine learning (ML). At the training stage, unlearnability embeds imperceptible

low relevancesurvey
Paper2610.34294v1

Factual Yet One-Sided: Stance Poisoning and Evidence Balancing in Retrieval-Augmented Generation

post-defense intervals included 0 in all eight settings, while the cross-model pro-poisoning results retained small positive residual point estimates of +0.045 to +0.063. For 20 candidate documents

medium relevanceattack
Paper2511.12414v1

The 'Sure' Trap: Multi-Scale Poisoning Analysis of Stealthy Compliance-Only Backdoors in Fine-Tuned Large Language Models

conduct a multi-scale analysis of this benign-label poisoning behavior across poison budget, total fine-tuning dataset size, and model size. A sharp threshold appears at small absolute budgets

medium relevanceattack
Paper2602.06616v1

Confundo: Learning to Generate Robust Poison for Practical RAG Systems

present Confundo, a learning-to-poison framework that fine-tunes a large language model as a poison generator to achieve high effectiveness, robustness, and stealthiness. Confundo provides a unified framework

medium relevancebenchmark
Paper2604.21416v1

CSC: Turning the Adversary's Poison against Itself

compromise model utility through unlearning methods that lead to accuracy degradation. This paper conducts a comprehensive analysis of backdoor attack dynamics during model training, revealing that poisoned samples form isolated

medium relevancebenchmark
Paper2609.14685v1

ViTeGate: Visual-Textual Triggered Knowledge Poisoning for Vision-Language Retrieval-Augmented Generation

inject poisoned image-text pairs into the knowledge corpus to influence model outputs. Existing knowledge poisoning attacks are typically always-on, allowing poisoned evidence to affect generation whenever

medium relevanceattack
Paper2610.19766v1

Analyzing and Mitigating Poisoning Attacks on Flow-Based Intrusion Detection

demonstrate that latent backdoors can be successfully implanted in flow-based IDS models by poisoning as little as 0.001% of the training data, maintaining near-nominal performance on clean inputs

high relevanceattack
Paper2610.01367v1

High-quality Data Do not Mean Safe! Poisoning LLMs after Data Selection

QSTO), which optimizes poisoned samples under an explicit quality constraint to survive selection while preserving their safety-degrading influence. Across poisoning settings, target models, and filtering rates, Bi-QSTO maintains

medium relevanceattack
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