Paper 2512.04785v1

ASTRIDE: A Security Threat Modeling Platform for Agentic-AI Applications

However, these systems introduce novel and evolving security challenges, including prompt injection attacks, context poisoning, model manipulation, and opaque agent-to-agent communication, that are not effectively captured by traditional

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Paper 2602.13427v1

Backdooring Bias in Large Language Models

model, with an adversary targeting the model builder's LLM. However, in the bias manipulation setting, the model builder themselves could be the adversary, warranting a white-box threat model

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Paper 2603.03398v1

Zero-Knowledge Federated Learning with Lattice-Based Hybrid Encryption for Quantum-Resilient Medical AI

models across hospitals without centralizing patient data. However, the exchange of model updates exposes critical vulnerabilities: gradient inversion attacks can reconstruct patient information, Byzantine clients can poison the global model

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Paper 2510.19303v1

Collaborative penetration testing suite for emerging generative AI algorithms

Problem Space: AI Vulnerabilities and Quantum Threats Generative AI vulnerabilities: model inversion, data poisoning, adversarial inputs. Quantum threats Shor Algorithm breaking RSA ECC encryption. Challenge Secure generative AI models against

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Paper 2602.04653v3

Inference-Time Backdoors via Hidden Instructions in LLM Chat Templates

model processing. We show that an adversary who distributes a model with a maliciously modified template can implant an inference-time backdoor without modifying model weights, poisoning training data

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Paper 2511.11020v1

Data Poisoning Vulnerabilities Across Healthcare AI Architectures: A Security Threat Analysis

analyses needed for detection. Supply chain weaknesses allow a single compromised vendor to poison models across 50 to 200 institutions. The Medical Scribe Sybil scenario shows how coordinated fake patient

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Picklescan is vulnerable to RCE through missing detection when calling

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Paper 2510.13462v1

Who Speaks for the Trigger? Dynamic Expert Routing in Backdoored Mixture-of-Experts Transformers

these targeted experts. Unlike traditional backdoor attacks that rely on superficial data poisoning or model editing, BadSwitch primarily embeds malicious triggers into expert routing paths with strong task affinity, enabling

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Paper 2601.14340v1

Turn-Based Structural Triggers: Prompt-Free Backdoors in Multi-Turn LLMs

oriented assistants. This growing ecosystem also raises supply-chain risks, where adversaries can distribute poisoned models that degrade downstream reliability and user trust. Existing backdoor attacks and defenses are largely

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Paper 2602.11472v1

Future Mining: Learning for Safety and Security

emerging cyber physical threats such as backdoor triggers, sensor spoofing, label flipping attacks, and poisoned model updates further jeopardize operational safety as mines adopt autonomous vehicles, humanoid assistance, and federated

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Paper 2511.12648v1

Scalable Hierarchical AI-Blockchain Framework for Real-Time Anomaly Detection in Large-Scale Autonomous Vehicle Networks

different attack types, such as sensor spoofing, jamming, and adversarial model poisoning, are conducted to test the scalability and resiliency of HAVEN. Experimental findings show sub-10 ms detection latency

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Paper 2512.00713v2

Concept-Guided Backdoor Attack on Vision Language Models

first, Concept-Thresholding Poisoning (CTP), uses explicit concepts in natural images as triggers: only samples containing the target concept are poisoned, causing the model to behave normally in all other

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Paper 2601.11664v1

Serverless AI Security: Attack Surface Analysis and Runtime Protection Mechanisms for FaaS-Based Machine Learning

characterize the attack surface across five categories: function-level vulnerabilities (cold start exploitation, dependency poisoning), model-specific threats (API-based extraction, adversarial inputs), infrastructure attacks (cross-function contamination, privilege escalation

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Paper 2512.06390v1

Web Technologies Security in the AI Era: A Survey of CDN-Enhanced Defenses

mitigate while reducing data movement and enhancing compliance, yet introduces new risks around model abuse, poisoning, and governance

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Paper 2510.25025v2

Secure Retrieval-Augmented Generation against Poisoning Attacks

Large language models (LLMs) have transformed natural language processing (NLP), enabling applications from content generation to decision support. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) improves LLMs by incorporating external knowledge but also

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Paper 2512.16962v1

MemoryGraft: Persistent Compromise of LLM Agents via Poisoned Experience Retrieval

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on long-term memory and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to persist experiences and refine future performance. While this experience learning capability enhances agentic

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Paper 2511.14715v2

FLARE: Adaptive Multi-Dimensional Reputation for Robust Client Reliability in Federated Learning

learning (FL) enables collaborative model training while preserving data privacy. However, it remains vulnerable to malicious clients who compromise model integrity through Byzantine attacks, data poisoning, or adaptive adversarial behaviors

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Paper 2510.03636v1

From Theory to Practice: Evaluating Data Poisoning Attacks and Defenses in In-Context Learning on Social Media Health Discourse

This study explored how in-context learning (ICL) in large language models can be disrupted by data poisoning attacks in the setting of public health sentiment analysis. Using tweets

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Paper 2512.12921v1

Cisco Integrated AI Security and Safety Framework Report

threats now span content safety failures (e.g., harmful or deceptive outputs), model and data integrity compromise (e.g., poisoning, supply-chain tampering), runtime manipulations (e.g., prompt injection, tool and agent misuse

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Paper 2512.10998v1

SCOUT: A Defense Against Data Poisoning Attacks in Fine-Tuned Language Models

Backdoor attacks create significant security threats to language models by

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