689 results in 576ms
Paper2610.08571v1

RAG-PIBench: A Leakage-Aware Benchmark for Prompt-Injection Detection in Trustworthy RAG Systems

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are vulnerable to prompt-injection attacks embedded in retrieved content. We introduce RAG-PIBench, a benchmark for RAG-style prompt-injection detection containing

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Paper2605.26999v1

Prompt Injection Detection is Regime-Dependent: A Deployment-Aware Evaluation with Interpretable Structural Signals

Prompt injection poses a critical threat to the safe deployment of large language models, yet existing detection approaches are typically evaluated under limited settings that do not reflect real-world

high relevancebenchmark
Paper2610.09264v1

Package Hallucination Attacks on Coding Agents through Prompt Injection in Rule Files

packages. To obtain effective malicious prompts injected into rule files, we propose PackHallu, an evolutionary optimization framework that iteratively rewrites these injected prompts using trajectory-level feedback and LLM-guided

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Paper2601.17383v1

Physical Prompt Injection Attacks on Large Vision-Language Models

reasoning in open physical environments. While LVLMs are known to be vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, existing methods either require access to input channels or depend on knowledge of user

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Paper2509.25926v1

Better Privilege Separation for Agents by Restricting Data Types

systems, such as AI agents. Unfortunately, these advantages have come with a vulnerability to prompt injections, an attack where an adversary subverts the LLM's intended functionality with an injected

medium relevanceattack
Paper2605.28017v1

Can It Reach the Generator? Investigating the Survival of Prompt-Injection Attacks in Realistic RAG Settings

Recent generative engine optimisation (GEO) research has shown that prompt-injection attacks can push a target product to the top of an LLM's recommendation list, with the strongest attacks

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Paper2605.18133v1

An Empirical Study of Privacy Leakage Chains via Prompt Injection in Black-Box Chatbot Environments

user' s task. This paper studies a privacy-leakage attack chain based on indirect prompt injection in black-box chatbot environments, where the attacker has no access to model weights

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Paper2604.25562v1

SnapGuard: Lightweight Prompt Injection Detection for Screenshot-Based Web Agents

effective paradigm for automating interactions with complex web environments, yet remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that embed malicious instructions into webpage content to induce unintended actions. This threat

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Paper2602.09222v1

MUZZLE: Adaptive Agentic Red-Teaming of Web Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks

users' behalf. While these agents offer powerful capabilities, their design exposes them to indirect prompt injection attacks embedded in untrusted web content, enabling adversaries to hijack agent behavior and violate

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Paper2601.17911v1

Prompt Injection Evaluations: Refusal Boundary Instability and Artifact-Dependent Compliance in GPT-4-Series Models

Prompt injection evaluations typically treat refusal as a stable, binary indicator of safety. This study challenges that paradigm by modeling refusal as a local decision boundary and examining its stability

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Paper2606.13038v1

Nous: An Attempt to Extract and Inject the Cognition Behind Prediction-Market Behavior

measuring the cognitive-monoculture problem and the limits of a prompt-level remedy, motivating deeper, below-the-prompt injection (fine-tuning, activation steering). Code, frozen profiles, prompts, and model outputs

medium relevanceattack
Paper2609.01046v1

HiveTraceGuard-Pro: A Compact Generative Guardrail for Prompt Injection, Jailbreaks, and Adversarial Obfuscation

mitigation is a separate guardrail model. Existing reports, however, provide little evidence on Russian prompt injection or Russian surface obfuscation. We present HiveTraceGuard-Pro, a 0.6B generative guardrail LoRA

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Paper2510.16128v1

Prompt injections as a tool for preserving identity in GAI image descriptions

have been described, but most require top down or external intervention. An emerging strategy, prompt injections, provides an empowering alternative: indirect users can mitigate harm against them, from within their

high relevancetool
Paper2609.36121v1

Render Before Reading: Visual Rendering as a Prompt Injection Defense

Large language models are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where third-party adversarial content can hijack the model's behavior. In this paper, we study the role played

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Paper2605.17324v1

ASPI: Seeking Ambiguity Clarification Amplifies Prompt Injection Vulnerability in LLM Agents

from standard execution to a clarification-seeking state increases an agent's susceptibility to prompt injection attacks. We introduce ASPI (Ambiguous-State Prompt Injection), a benchmark of 728 task-attack

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Paper2512.00966v1

Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection via Instruction-Following Intent Analysis

Indirect prompt injection attacks (IPIAs), where large language models (LLMs) follow malicious instructions hidden in input data, pose a critical threat to LLM-powered agents. In this paper, we present

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Paper2602.14211v1

SkillJect: Automating Stealthy Skill-Based Prompt Injection for Coding Agents with Trace-Driven Closed-Loop Refinement

extend tool-augmented behaviors. This abstraction introduces an under-measured attack surface: skill-based prompt injection, where poisoned skills can steer agents away from user intent and safety policies

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Paper2607.14611v1

Bad Memory: Evaluating Prompt Injection Risks from Memory in Agentic Systems

agents more useful and self-improving, it also creates a new attack surface for prompt injections in which malicious instructions can be embedded within persistent files and influence future behavior

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Paper2512.15081v1

Quantifying Return on Security Controls in LLM Systems

subjected to automated attacks with Garak across five vulnerability classes: PII leakage, latent context injection, prompt injection, adversarial attack generation, and divergence. For each (vulnerability, control) pair, attack success probabilities

medium relevancetool
Paper2511.20597v1

BrowseSafe: Understanding and Preventing Prompt Injection Within AI Browser Agents

security challenges that go beyond traditional web application threat models. Prior work has identified prompt injection as a new attack vector for web agents, yet the resulting impact within real

high relevanceattack
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