Bad Memory: Evaluating Prompt Injection Risks from Memory in Agentic Systems

agents more useful and self-improving, it also creates a new attack surface for prompt injections in which malicious instructions can be embedded within persistent files and influence future behavior

Quantifying Return on Security Controls in LLM Systems

subjected to automated attacks with Garak across five vulnerability classes: PII leakage, latent context injection, prompt injection, adversarial attack generation, and divergence. For each (vulnerability, control) pair, attack success probabilities

BrowseSafe: Understanding and Preventing Prompt Injection Within AI Browser Agents

security challenges that go beyond traditional web application threat models. Prior work has identified prompt injection as a new attack vector for web agents, yet the resulting impact within real

WebAgentGuard: A Reasoning-Driven Guard Model for Detecting Prompt Injection Attacks in Web Agents

textual webpage content to accomplish user-specified tasks. However, they are highly vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in HTML or rendered screenshots can manipulate agent behavior

WARD: Adversarially Robust Defense of Web Agents Against Prompt Injections

interacting with websites, but their exposure to open web environments makes them vulnerable to prompt injection attacks embedded in HTML content or visual interfaces. Existing guard models still suffer from

PI-Hunter: Automated Red-Teaming for Exposing and Localizing Prompt Injections

that interact with external tools and environments, introducing new security risks such as indirect prompt injection attacks through untrusted external sources. Existing defenses mainly focus on blocking malicious content

OpenClaude Sandbox Bypass via Model-Controlled `dangerouslyDisableSandbox` Input

IPI-proxy: An Intercepting Proxy for Red-Teaming Web-Browsing AI Agents Against Indirect Prompt Injection

HTML pages those domains serve. Existing red-teaming resources fall short of this scenario: prompt-injection benchmarks ship pre-built adversarial pages that whitelisted agents cannot reach, and generic

Agent Privilege Separation in OpenClaw: A Structural Defense Against Prompt Injection

Prompt injection remains one of the most practical attack vectors against LLM-integrated applications. We replicate the Microsoft LLMail-Inject benchmark (Greshake et al., 2024) against current generation models running

GraphCypherQAChain class of langchain-ai/langchain version 0.2.5 allows for SQL injection through prompt injection. This vulnerability can lead to unauthorized data manipulation, data exfiltration, denial of service

TRACER: Trace-Regularized Training Against Indirect Prompt Injection

Indirect prompt injection uses untrusted retrieved content, tool outputs, or agent messages to override an LLM's intended behavior. We show that defense robustness is channel-conditioned: the same attack

Readable Before Actionable: Causal Tracing of Indirect Prompt Injection

Indirect prompt injection causes LLM agents to follow commands embedded in external data. A probe may distinguish instructions from data without identifying a state edit that changes the next action

Rethinking Penetration Testing for AI-Enabled Systems: From Resource Compromise to Behavioral Objective Violation

This definition preserves conventional penetration testing while extending it to adversarial pathways such as prompt injection, indirect prompt injection, data poisoning, sensor manipulation, retrieval poisoning, tool misuse, and agentic misalignment

A Framework for Formalizing LLM Agent Security

executes a user task. Using this framework, we reformalize existing attacks, such as indirect prompt injection, direct prompt injection, jailbreak, task drift, and memory poisoning, as violations

AlignSentinel: Alignment-Aware Detection of Prompt Injection Attacks

Prompt injection attacks insert malicious instructions into an LLM's input to steer it toward an attacker-chosen task instead of the intended one. Existing detection defenses typically classify

Airtable Agent nodes that allows unauthenticated attackers to inject malicious code via prompt injection. Attackers can exploit unblocked pandas functions like pd.read_json() to exfiltrate datasets, perform SSRF against internal

Divide and Inject: Can Agents Reconstruct an Indirect Prompt Injection from Fragments?

large language models powering these agents also create new attack surfaces for indirect prompt injection. In particular, an attacker may not need to place a complete malicious instruction in retrieved

langchain-ai/langchainjs versions 0.2.5 and all versions with this class allows for prompt injection, leading to SQL injection. This vulnerability permits unauthorized data manipulation, data exfiltration, denial of service

Where Do LLMs Decide to Break the Rules? Mechanistic Localization of Prompt Injection Compliance

When a prompt injection attack succeeds, a Large Language Model (LLM) abandons its assigned system role to comply with an adversarial instruction. While prior work has extensively quantified how often

Security Assessment of DeepSeek Harness with A.I.G: Evaluating Resistance to Indirect Prompt Injection

assess indirect prompt injection in DeepSeek Harness (DSH), using AI-Infra-Guard (A.I.G) to construct tests, deliver controlled taint, execute DSH, collect traces, and judge outcomes. The study covers