294 results in 81ms
Paper 2509.26032v2

Stealthy Yet Effective: Distribution-Preserving Backdoor Attacks on Graph Classification

semantic deviation caused by label flipping, both of which make poisoned graphs easily detectable by anomaly detection models. To address this, we propose DPSBA, a clean-label backdoor framework that

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Paper 2603.18034v1

Semantic Chameleon: Corpus-Dependent Poisoning Attacks and Defenses in RAG Systems

documents are preferentially retrieved at inference time, enabling targeted manipulation of model outputs. We study gradient-guided corpus poisoning attacks against modern RAG pipelines and evaluate retrieval-layer defenses that

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Paper 2602.11213v1

Transferable Backdoor Attacks for Code Models via Sharpness-Aware Adversarial Perturbation

software development but remain vulnerable to backdoor attacks via poisoned training data. Existing backdoor attacks on code models face a fundamental trade-off between transferability and stealthiness. Static trigger-based

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Paper 2604.06833v1

FedDetox: Robust Federated SLM Alignment via On-Device Data Sanitization

critical issue we define as unintended data poisoning, which can severely damage the safety alignment of global models during federated alignment. To address this, we propose FedDetox, a robust framework

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Paper 2604.27434v1

AdaBFL: Multi-Layer Defensive Adaptive Aggregation for Bzantine-Robust Federated Learning

data. However, FL's decentralized nature makes it vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where malicious clients can submit corrupted models to manipulate the system. To counter such attacks, although various Byzantine

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Paper 2602.06532v1

Dependable Artificial Intelligence with Reliability and Security (DAIReS): A Unified Syndrome Decoding Approach for Hallucination and Backdoor Trigger Detection

models, including Large Language Models (LLMs), are characterized by a range of system-level attributes such as security and reliability. Recent studies have demonstrated that ML models are vulnerable

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Paper 2605.05632v1

Architecture Matters: Comparing RAG Systems under Knowledge Base Poisoning

models - remain untested against adversarially optimized contradictions. We evaluate four RAG architectures (vanilla RAG, agentic RAG, MADAM-RAG, and Recursive Language Models) under controlled single-document (N=1) poisoning

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Paper 2509.19921v2

On the Fragility of Contribution Score Computation in Federated Learning

alter the final scores. Second, we explore vulnerabilities posed by poisoning attacks, where malicious participants strategically manipulate their model updates to inflate their own contribution scores or reduce the importance

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Paper 2606.09499v1

Targeting World Models to Compromise Robot Learning Pipelines

While highly practical, in this work we demonstrate that world models introduce a uniquely stealthy and effective data poisoning entry point into the robot learning supply chain that can result

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Paper 2603.01019v1

BadRSSD: Backdoor Attacks on Regularized Self-Supervised Diffusion Models

backdoor attack targeting the representation layer of self-supervised diffusion models. Specifically, it hijacks the semantic representations of poisoned samples with triggers in Principal Component Analysis (PCA) space toward those

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Paper 2601.05504v2

Memory Poisoning Attack and Defense on Memory Based LLM-Agents

Large language model agents equipped with persistent memory are vulnerable to memory poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject malicious instructions through query only interactions that corrupt the agents long term memory

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Paper 2509.21761v2

Backdoor Attribution: Elucidating and Controlling Backdoor in Language Models

Fine-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks through data poisoning, yet the internal mechanisms governing these attacks remain a black box. Previous research on interpretability

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Paper 2604.04289v1

Poisoned Identifiers Survive LLM Deobfuscation: A Case Study on Claude Opus 4.6

poisoned identifier names in the string table survive into the model's reconstructed code, even when the model demonstrably understands the correct semantics? Using Claude Opus 4.6 across 192 inference

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Paper 2604.07403v1

RefineRAG: Word-Level Poisoning Attacks via Retriever-Guided Text Refinement

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) significantly enhances Large Language Models (LLMs), but simultaneously exposes a critical vulnerability to knowledge poisoning attacks. Existing attack methods like PoisonedRAG remain detectable due to coarse

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Paper 2605.26754v1

Cordon-MAS: Defending RAG against Knowledge Poisoning via Information-Flow Control

Confundo-style poisoning where adversarially optimized documents manipulate generated outputs. Existing defenses assume that detecting poisoned evidence prevents harm. We show this assumption is incorrect: models exhibit a monitoring-control

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Paper 2602.04899v1

Phantom Transfer: Data-level Defences are Insufficient Against Data Poisoning

data-level defences are insufficient for stopping sophisticated data poisoning attacks. We suggest that future work should focus on model audits and white-box security methods

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Paper 2604.07536v1

TRUSTDESC: Preventing Tool Poisoning in LLM Applications via Trusted Description Generation

injection attack surface: tool poisoning attacks (TPAs). Attackers manipulate tool descriptions by embedding malicious instructions (explicit TPAs) or misleading claims (implicit TPAs) to influence model behavior and tool selection. Existing

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Paper 2602.02629v1

Trustworthy Blockchain-based Federated Learning for Electronic Health Records: Securing Participant Identity with Decentralized Identifiers and Verifiable Credentials

patient data. Despite its potential, FL remains vulnerable to poisoning and Sybil attacks, in which malicious participants corrupt the global model or infiltrate the network using fake identities. While recent

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Paper 2602.19547v1

CIBER: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Security Evaluation of Code Interpreter Agents

four major types of adversarial attacks: Direct/Indirect Prompt Injection, Memory Poisoning, and Prompt-based Backdoor. We evaluate six foundation models across two representative code interpreter agents (OpenInterpreter and OpenCodeInterpreter), incorporating

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Paper 2602.07200v1

BadSNN: Backdoor Attacks on Spiking Neural Networks via Adversarial Spiking Neuron

converts input data into spikes following the Leaky Integrate-and-Fire (LIF) neuron model. This model includes several important hyperparameters, such as the membrane potential threshold and membrane time constant

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