Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic Coding Assistants: A Systematic Analysis of Vulnerabilities in Skills, Tools, and Protocol Ecosystems

this \textbf{Systematization of Knowledge (SoK)} paper, we present a comprehensive analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting agentic coding assistants. We propose a novel three-dimensional taxonomy categorizing attacks across

Agent Skills Enable a New Class of Realistic and Trivially Simple Prompt Injections

useful tool, we show that they are fundamentally insecure, since they enable trivially simple prompt injections. We demonstrate how to hide malicious instructions in long Agent Skill files and referenced

DE-FIVE: Detecting Malicious Image Prompts via Fourier Features and Image Vector Embeddings

VLMs, making them more susceptible to security threats such as adversarial perturbations and indirect prompt injection, wherein crafted malicious image prompts can elicit unintended model outputs. Existing defense methods against

IH-Challenge: A Training Dataset to Improve Instruction Hierarchy on Frontier LLMs

resolving instruction conflicts. IH is key to defending against jailbreaks, system prompt extractions, and agentic prompt injections. However, robust IH behavior is difficult to train: IH failures can be confounded

Bypassing Prompt Injection Detectors through Evasive Injections

vulnerable to task drift; deviations from a user's intended instruction due to injected secondary prompts. Recent work has shown that linear probes trained on activation deltas of LLMs' hidden

When Prompts Become Payloads: A Framework for Mitigating SQL Injection Attacks in Large Language Model-Driven Applications

attack patterns. We evaluate the proposed framework under diverse and realistic attack scenarios, including prompt injection, obfuscated SQL payloads, and context-manipulation attacks. To ensure robustness, we generate and curate

PraisonAI has an Arbitrary File Write in Python API

Attention is All You Need to Defend Against Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks in LLMs

agents) to perform more sophisticated tasks. However, LLM-empowered applications are vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks, where instructions are injected via untrustworthy external data sources. This paper presents

The Vulnerability of LLM Rankers to Prompt Injection Attacks

LLMs) have emerged as powerful re-rankers. Recent research has however showed that simple prompt injections embedded within a candidate document (i.e., jailbreak prompt attacks) can significantly alter

When Benchmarks Lie: Evaluating Malicious Prompt Classifiers Under True Distribution Shift

Detecting prompt injection and jailbreak attacks is critical for deploying LLM-based agents safely. As agents increasingly process untrusted data from emails, documents, tool outputs, and external APIs, robust attack

AgenticMail: Unauthenticated inbound mail triggers bypassPermissions resume of the operator

@mobilenext/mobile-mcp: Arbitrary Android Intent Execution via mobile_open_url

Langchain through 0.0.155, prompt injection allows an attacker to force the service to retrieve data from an arbitrary URL, essentially providing SSRF and potentially injecting content into downstream tasks

Prompt Fencing: A Cryptographic Approach to Establishing Security Boundaries in Large Language Model Prompts

present Prompt Fencing, a novel architectural approach that applies cryptographic authentication and data architecture principles to establish explicit security boundaries within LLM prompts. Our approach decorates prompt segments with cryptographically

Fingerprinting LLMs via Prompt Injection

prompts, which are not robust to post-processing. In this work, we propose LLMPrint, a novel detection framework that constructs fingerprints by exploiting LLMs' inherent vulnerability to prompt injection

Brain-Prompt Injection: A Route-Safety Audit for BCI-LLM Agents

channel for tool-use agents, exposing a new attack surface we call \emph{brain-prompt injection}: signal-side perturbations, context-only injections, and adaptive dual-decoder attacks can all change

auth-fetch-mcp: SSRF and disk exfiltration via unvalidated auth

TEMPLATEFUZZ: Fine-Grained Chat Template Fuzzing for Jailbreaking and Red Teaming LLMs

elicit harmful outputs, poses significant security risks. While prior work has primarily focused on prompt injection attacks, these approaches often require resource-intensive prompt engineering and overlook other critical components

ChatGPT: Excellent Paper! Accept It. Editor: Imposter Found! Review Rejected

that the review was generated by an LLM, not a human. This method turns prompt injections from vulnerability into a verification tool. We outline our design, expected model behaviors

Securing LLM-as-a-Service for Small Businesses: An Industry Case Study of a Distributed Chatbot Deployment Platform

tenant data access controls. In addition, the platform integrates practical, platform-level defences against prompt injection attacks in RAG-based chatbots, translating insights from recent prompt injection research into deployable