427 results in 80ms
Paper 2602.16752v1

The Vulnerability of LLM Rankers to Prompt Injection Attacks

LLMs) have emerged as powerful re-rankers. Recent research has however showed that simple prompt injections embedded within a candidate document (i.e., jailbreak prompt attacks) can significantly alter

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Paper 2602.14161v1

When Benchmarks Lie: Evaluating Malicious Prompt Classifiers Under True Distribution Shift

Detecting prompt injection and jailbreak attacks is critical for deploying LLM-based agents safely. As agents increasingly process untrusted data from emails, documents, tool outputs, and external APIs, robust attack

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Paper 2511.19727v1

Prompt Fencing: A Cryptographic Approach to Establishing Security Boundaries in Large Language Model Prompts

present Prompt Fencing, a novel architectural approach that applies cryptographic authentication and data architecture principles to establish explicit security boundaries within LLM prompts. Our approach decorates prompt segments with cryptographically

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Paper 2509.25448v2

Fingerprinting LLMs via Prompt Injection

prompts, which are not robust to post-processing. In this work, we propose LLMPrint, a novel detection framework that constructs fingerprints by exploiting LLMs' inherent vulnerability to prompt injection

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Paper 2606.09315v1

Brain-Prompt Injection: A Route-Safety Audit for BCI-LLM Agents

channel for tool-use agents, exposing a new attack surface we call \emph{brain-prompt injection}: signal-side perturbations, context-only injections, and adaptive dual-decoder attacks can all change

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Paper 2604.12232v1

TEMPLATEFUZZ: Fine-Grained Chat Template Fuzzing for Jailbreaking and Red Teaming LLMs

elicit harmful outputs, poses significant security risks. While prior work has primarily focused on prompt injection attacks, these approaches often require resource-intensive prompt engineering and overlook other critical components

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Paper 2512.20405v2

ChatGPT: Excellent Paper! Accept It. Editor: Imposter Found! Review Rejected

that the review was generated by an LLM, not a human. This method turns prompt injections from vulnerability into a verification tool. We outline our design, expected model behaviors

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Paper 2601.15528v1

Securing LLM-as-a-Service for Small Businesses: An Industry Case Study of a Distributed Chatbot Deployment Platform

tenant data access controls. In addition, the platform integrates practical, platform-level defences against prompt injection attacks in RAG-based chatbots, translating insights from recent prompt injection research into deployable

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Paper 2603.17705v1

Parameter-Efficient Modality-Balanced Symmetric Fusion for Multimodal Remote Sensing Semantic Segmentation

representations while minimizing the number of trainable parameters. Specifically, we design a Cross-modal Prompt-Injected Adapter (CPIA) to enable deep semantic interaction by generating shared prompts and injecting them

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Paper 2510.11238v1

Attacks by Content: Automated Fact-checking is an AI Security Issue

manipulate the data they receive to subvert their behaviour. Previous research has studied indirect prompt injection, where the attacker injects malicious instructions. We argue that injection of instructions

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Paper 2510.05244v1

Indirect Prompt Injections: Are Firewalls All You Need, or Stronger Benchmarks?

agents are vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in external content or tool outputs cause unintended or harmful behavior. Inspired by the well-established concept

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Paper 2606.13044v1

No Hidden Prompts Needed! You Can Game AI Peer Review with Presentation-Only Revisions

infrastructure, most robustness concerns have focused on explicit attacks such as hidden instructions and prompt injection. We study a harder and more policy-relevant failure mode: no hidden text

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Paper 2603.28013v1

Kill-Chain Canaries: Stage-Level Tracking of Prompt Injection Across Attack Surfaces and Model Safety Tiers

present a stage-decomposed analysis of prompt injection attacks against five frontier LLM agents. Prior work measures task-level attack success rate (ASR); we localize the pipeline stage at which

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Paper 2510.09023v1

The Attacker Moves Second: Stronger Adaptive Attacks Bypass Defenses Against Llm Jailbreaks and Prompt Injections

should we evaluate the robustness of language model defenses? Current defenses against jailbreaks and prompt injections (which aim to prevent an attacker from eliciting harmful knowledge or remotely triggering malicious

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Paper 2605.28116v1

MIRAGE: Context-Aware Prompt Injection against Mobile GUI Agents via User-Generated Content

Injection of Realistic Adversarial GUI Examples), a pipeline that turns benign mobile screenshots into prompt-injection samples by placing attacker-controlled text into ordinary user-generated content regions, without modifying

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Paper 2601.04666v1

Know Thy Enemy: Securing LLMs Against Prompt Injection via Diverse Data Synthesis and Instruction-Level Chain-of-Thought Learning

model (LLM)-integrated applications have become increasingly prevalent, yet face critical security vulnerabilities from prompt injection (PI) attacks. Defending against PI attacks faces two major issues: malicious instructions

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Paper 2603.10749v1

AttriGuard: Defeating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Causal Attribution of Tool Invocations

agents are highly vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI), where adversaries embed malicious directives in untrusted tool outputs to hijack execution. Most existing defenses treat IPI as an input-level

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Paper 2602.07918v1

CausalArmor: Efficient Indirect Prompt Injection Guardrails via Causal Attribution

agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized

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Paper 2602.01795v1

RedVisor: Reasoning-Aware Prompt Injection Defense via Zero-Copy KV Cache Reuse

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly vulnerable to Prompt Injection (PI) attacks, where adversarial instructions hidden within retrieved contexts hijack the model's execution flow. Current defenses typically face

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Paper 2606.11806v1

External Experience Serving in Production LLM Systems: A Deployment-Oriented Study of Quality-Cost Trade-offs

expose different output-cost regimes. We compare no-experience baselines, random experience controls, global prompt injection, and retrieval-based selective injection, and analyze both task quality and serving cost

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