Architecture Matters: Comparing RAG Systems under Knowledge Base Poisoning

models - remain untested against adversarially optimized contradictions. We evaluate four RAG architectures (vanilla RAG, agentic RAG, MADAM-RAG, and Recursive Language Models) under controlled single-document (N=1) poisoning

On the Fragility of Contribution Score Computation in Federated Learning

alter the final scores. Second, we explore vulnerabilities posed by poisoning attacks, where malicious participants strategically manipulate their model updates to inflate their own contribution scores or reduce the importance

Targeting World Models to Compromise Robot Learning Pipelines

While highly practical, in this work we demonstrate that world models introduce a uniquely stealthy and effective data poisoning entry point into the robot learning supply chain that can result

BadRSSD: Backdoor Attacks on Regularized Self-Supervised Diffusion Models

backdoor attack targeting the representation layer of self-supervised diffusion models. Specifically, it hijacks the semantic representations of poisoned samples with triggers in Principal Component Analysis (PCA) space toward those

IssueTrojanBench: Benchmarking AI Coding Agents Against Malicious Issue Requests

security risks from both the LLM backbone, where adversarial prompts, poisoned training data, and backdoor triggers can cause models to emit insecure or attacker-chosen code, and their agentic architecture

Memory Poisoning Attack and Defense on Memory Based LLM-Agents

Large language model agents equipped with persistent memory are vulnerable to memory poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject malicious instructions through query only interactions that corrupt the agents long term memory

Backdoor Attribution: Elucidating and Controlling Backdoor in Language Models

Fine-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks through data poisoning, yet the internal mechanisms governing these attacks remain a black box. Previous research on interpretability

Anti-Backdoor Coreset Selection via Cumulative Entropy

time defenses against neural backdoors isolate a benign subset from poisoned training data, to learn a backdoor-free model from it. In this paper, we formulate this defense strategy

Assessing the Operational Impact of Poisoning Attacks over Augmented 3D Point Cloud Public Datasets for Connected and Autonomous Vehicles

system apply over the learned models. Its impact over data augmentation models is unclear. While data augmentation reduces the likelihood of poisoning attack success, some valid questions remain. Is data

Open WebUI's process_files_batch() endpoint missing ownership check

Poisoned Identifiers Survive LLM Deobfuscation: A Case Study on Claude Opus 4.6

poisoned identifier names in the string table survive into the model's reconstructed code, even when the model demonstrably understands the correct semantics? Using Claude Opus 4.6 across 192 inference

RefineRAG: Word-Level Poisoning Attacks via Retriever-Guided Text Refinement

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) significantly enhances Large Language Models (LLMs), but simultaneously exposes a critical vulnerability to knowledge poisoning attacks. Existing attack methods like PoisonedRAG remain detectable due to coarse

Cordon-MAS: Defending RAG against Knowledge Poisoning via Information-Flow Control

Confundo-style poisoning where adversarially optimized documents manipulate generated outputs. Existing defenses assume that detecting poisoned evidence prevents harm. We show this assumption is incorrect: models exhibit a monitoring-control

Phantom Transfer: Data-level Defences are Insufficient Against Data Poisoning

data-level defences are insufficient for stopping sophisticated data poisoning attacks. We suggest that future work should focus on model audits and white-box security methods

TRUSTDESC: Preventing Tool Poisoning in LLM Applications via Trusted Description Generation

injection attack surface: tool poisoning attacks (TPAs). Attackers manipulate tool descriptions by embedding malicious instructions (explicit TPAs) or misleading claims (implicit TPAs) to influence model behavior and tool selection. Existing

Trustworthy Blockchain-based Federated Learning for Electronic Health Records: Securing Participant Identity with Decentralized Identifiers and Verifiable Credentials

patient data. Despite its potential, FL remains vulnerable to poisoning and Sybil attacks, in which malicious participants corrupt the global model or infiltrate the network using fake identities. While recent

CIBER: A Comprehensive Benchmark for Security Evaluation of Code Interpreter Agents

four major types of adversarial attacks: Direct/Indirect Prompt Injection, Memory Poisoning, and Prompt-based Backdoor. We evaluate six foundation models across two representative code interpreter agents (OpenInterpreter and OpenCodeInterpreter), incorporating

The safety failures we are not instrumenting: a perspective on hidden safety-critical challenges in modern AI systems

legitimacy laundering in retrieval, prompt injection, reward hacking, memory poisoning, evaluation deception, fictional human oversight, synthetic evidence pollution, and model collapse. We conclude with design and governance recommendations

BadSNN: Backdoor Attacks on Spiking Neural Networks via Adversarial Spiking Neuron

converts input data into spikes following the Leaky Integrate-and-Fire (LIF) neuron model. This model includes several important hyperparameters, such as the membrane potential threshold and membrane time constant

Context Contamination in LLM Analysis of Network Security Logs: Poison with Passive Prompt Injection and Mitigation Evaluation

Large Language Models are increasingly deployed in Security Operations Centers