AgentSentry: Mitigating Indirect Prompt Injection in LLM Agents via Temporal Causal Diagnostics and Context Purification
retrieval systems to autonomously complete complex tasks. However, this design exposes agents to indirect prompt injection (IPI), where attacker-controlled context embedded in tool outputs or retrieved content silently steers
CommandSans: Securing AI Agents with Surgical Precision Prompt Sanitization
access to numerous tools and sensitive data significantly widens the attack surface for indirect prompt injections. Due to the context-dependent nature of attacks, however, current defenses are often
Overcoming the Retrieval Barrier: Indirect Prompt Injection in the Wild for LLM Systems
rely on retrieving information from external corpora. This creates a new attack surface: indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions are planted in the corpora and hijack model behavior once
Whispers of Wealth: Red-Teaming Google's Agent Payments Protocol via Prompt Injection
teaming evaluation of AP2 and identify vulnerabilities arising from indirect and direct prompt injection. We introduce two attack techniques, the Branded Whisper Attack and the Vault Whisper Attack which manipulate
CodeSentinel: A Three-Layer Defense Against Indirect Prompt Injection in Code Contexts
code context from repositories, documentation, issue threads, and coding-agent environments, creating an indirect prompt-injection surface where attackers hide instructions in comments, strings, identifiers, or decoy code. We propose
The Landscape of Prompt Injection Threats in LLM Agents: From Taxonomy to Analysis
LLMs) has resulted in a paradigm shift towards autonomous agents, necessitating robust security against Prompt Injection (PI) vulnerabilities where untrusted inputs hijack agent behaviors. This SoK presents a comprehensive overview
Towards Reliable and Practical LLM Security Evaluations via Bayesian Modelling
prompts are designed imperfectly, and practitioners only have a limited amount of compute to evaluate vulnerabilities. We show the improved inferential capabilities of the model in several prompt injection attack
QueryIPI: Query-agnostic Indirect Prompt Injection on Coding Agents
high-privilege system access, creating a high-stakes attack surface. Prior work on Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) is mainly query-specific, requiring particular user queries as triggers and leading
Trojan Horses in Recruiting: A Red-Teaming Case Study on Indirect Prompt Injection in Standard vs. Reasoning Models
automated decision-making pipelines, specifically within Human Resources (HR), the security implications of Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) become critical. While a prevailing hypothesis posits that "Reasoning" or "Chain-of-Thought
Amplification Effects in Test-Time Reinforcement Learning: Safety and Reasoning Vulnerabilities
labels. However, this reliance on test data also makes TTT methods vulnerable to harmful prompt injections. In this paper, we investigate safety vulnerabilities of TTT methods, where we study
AgentVisor: Defending LLM Agents Against Prompt Injection via Semantic Virtualization
data with privileged execution exposes them to severe security risks, particularly direct and indirect prompt injection. Existing defenses face significant challenges in balancing security with utility, often encountering a trade
Silent Egress: When Implicit Prompt Injection Makes LLM Agents Leak Without a Trace
URLs and calling external tools. We show that this workflow gives rise to implicit prompt injection: adversarial instructions embedded in automatically generated URL previews, including titles, metadata, and snippets
When AUC 0.998 Is Not Enough: A Candidate Evaluation Protocol for Hidden-State Probes of Indirect Prompt Injection in Multimodal Computer-Use Agents
model's internal activations -- has emerged as an attractive evaluation tool for flagging indirect prompt injection (IPI) in multimodal computer-use agents before the agent emits a corrupted action
On the Geometric Limits of Transformer Defenses against Obfuscation Attacks: Latent Embedding Collapse & Performance Robustness Gap
Prompt injection attacks pose significant risks to language model safety, yet existing defenses are typically evaluated using classification performance. We show that high detection performance does not imply representational robustness
How Vulnerable Are AI Agents to Indirect Prompt Injections? Insights from a Large-Scale Public Competition
data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness
FocusAgent: Simple Yet Effective Ways of Trimming the Large Context of Web Agents
computational cost processing; moreover, processing full pages exposes agents to security risks such as prompt injection. Existing pruning strategies either discard relevant content or retain irrelevant context, leading to suboptimal
Hidden-in-Plain-Text: A Benchmark for Social-Web Indirect Prompt Injection in RAG
amplifying both their usefulness and their attack surface. Most notably, indirect prompt injection and retrieval poisoning attack the web-native carriers that survive ingestion pipelines and are very concerning
AdapTools: Adaptive Tool-based Indirect Prompt Injection Attacks on Agentic LLMs
powerful for complex task execution. However, this advancement introduces critical security vulnerabilities, particularly indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Existing attack methods are limited by their reliance on static patterns
AgentDyn: A Dynamic Open-Ended Benchmark for Evaluating Prompt Injection Attacks of Real-World Agent Security System
However, the external data which agent consumes also leads to the risk of indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in third-party content hijack agent behavior. Guided
AegisAgent: An Autonomous Defense Agent Against Prompt Injection Attacks in LLM-HARs
understanding. However, the reliability of these systems is critically undermined by their vulnerability to prompt injection attacks, where attackers deliberately input deceptive instructions into LLMs. Traditional defenses, based on static