Paper 2512.13703v1

Safe2Harm: Semantic Isomorphism Attacks for Jailbreaking Large Language Models

attackers to generate harmful content, causing adverse impacts across various societal domains. Most existing jailbreak methods revolve around Prompt Engineering or adversarial optimization, yet we identify a previously overlooked phenomenon

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Paper 2606.11817v1

Grammar-Constrained Decoding Can Jailbreak LLMs into Generating Malicious Code

LLM-generated code by enforcing syntactic validity. In this paper, we reveal a counterintuitive risk: this reliability-oriented technique can itself become an attack surface. We uncover a new jailbreak

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Paper 2601.20903v1

ICON: Intent-Context Coupling for Efficient Multi-Turn Jailbreak Attack

step LLM interaction, and often stagnate in suboptimal regions due to surface-level optimization. In this paper, we characterize the Intent-Context Coupling phenomenon, revealing that LLM safety constraints

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Paper 2601.03594v1

Jailbreaking LLMs & VLMs: Mechanisms, Evaluation, and Unified Defense

paper provides a systematic survey of jailbreak attacks and defenses on Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs), emphasizing that jailbreak vulnerabilities stem from structural factors such

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Paper 2512.14751v1

One Leak Away: How Pretrained Model Exposure Amplifies Jailbreak Risks in Finetuned LLMs

jailbreak vulnerabilities from their pretrained sources. We investigate this question in a realistic pretrain-to-finetune threat model, where the attacker has white-box access to the pretrained LLM

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Paper 2604.20994v1

Breaking MCP with Function Hijacking Attacks: Novel Threats for Function Calling and Agentic Models

extend the capabilities of AI-powered system by invoking external functions. Injection and jailbreaking attacks have been extensively explored to showcase the vulnerabilities of LLMs to user prompt manipulation

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Paper 2602.08062v1

Efficient and Adaptable Detection of Malicious LLM Prompts via Bootstrap Aggregation

susceptible to malicious prompts that induce unsafe or policy-violating behavior through harmful requests, jailbreak techniques, and prompt injection attacks. Existing defenses face fundamental limitations: black-box moderation APIs offer

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Paper 2602.02280v1

RACA: Representation-Aware Coverage Criteria for LLM Safety Testing

sophisticated capabilities also introduce severe safety concerns, particularly the generation of harmful content through jailbreak attacks. Current safety testing for LLMs often relies on static datasets and lacks systematic criteria

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Paper 2512.03356v2

From static to adaptive: immune memory-based jailbreak detection for large language models

these methods remain inherently static and struggle to adapt to the evolving nature of jailbreak attacks. Drawing inspiration from the biological immune mechanism, we introduce the Immune Memory Adaptive Guard

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Paper 2511.19218v2

Adversarial Attack-Defense Co-Evolution for LLM Safety Alignment via Tree-Group Dual-Aware Search and Optimization

unprecedented capabilities while amplifying societal risks. Existing works tend to focus on either isolated jailbreak attacks or static defenses, neglecting the dynamic interplay between evolving threats and safeguards in real

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Paper 2605.05662v1

XL-SafetyBench: A Country-Grounded Cross-Cultural Benchmark for LLM Safety and Cultural Sensitivity

Current LLM safety benchmarks are predominantly English-centric and often rely on translation, failing to capture country-specific harms. Moreover, they rarely evaluate a model's ability to detect culturally

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Paper 2606.12709v1

Smarter Saboteurs, Better Fixers: Scaling & Security in Linear Multi-Agent Workflows

LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) are deployed in the wild, the resilience of their collaboration structures against adversarial compromise becomes a critical safety concern. Attackers may leverage prompt-injection

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Paper 2605.10611v1

Re-Triggering Safeguards within LLMs for Jailbreak Detection

defend against jailbreak attacks. Although recent LLMs are equipped with built-in safeguards, it remains possible to craft jailbreaking prompts that bypass them. We argue that such jailbreaking prompts

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Paper 2603.11132v2

WebWeaver: Breaking Topology Confidentiality in LLM Multi-Agent Systems with Stealthy Context-Based Inference

Communication topology is a critical factor in the utility and safety of LLM-based multi-agent systems (LLM-MAS), making it a high-value intellectual property (IP) whose confidentiality remains

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Paper 2605.27701v1

Cross-Entropy Games and Frost Training

method for improving Monte Carlo-based policy optimization for a large family of LLM-as-a-judge tasks called Cross-Entropy Games. The key idea is to exploit the gradient

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Paper 2510.02422v3

Dynamic Target Attack

Existing gradient-based jailbreak attacks typically optimize an adversarial suffix to induce a fixed affirmative response, e.g., ``Sure, here is...''. However, this fixed target usually resides in an extremely

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Paper 2603.14278v1

Activation Surgery: Jailbreaking White-box LLMs without Touching the Prompt

Most jailbreak techniques for Large Language Models (LLMs) primarily rely on prompt modifications, including paraphrasing, obfuscation, or conversational strategies. Meanwhile, abliteration techniques (also known as targeted ablations of internal components

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Paper 2601.15801v1

Attributing and Exploiting Safety Vectors through Global Optimization in Large Language Models

models. Building on these insights, we develop a novel inference-time white-box jailbreak method that exploits the identified safety vectors through activation repatching. Our attack substantially outperforms existing white

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Paper 2511.06852v4

Differentiated Directional Intervention A Framework for Evading LLM Safety Alignment

harm detection direction via direct steering. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DBDI outperforms prominent jailbreaking methods, achieving up to a 97.88\% attack success rate on models such as Llama

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Paper 2510.02194v1

UpSafe$^\circ$C: Upcycling for Controllable Safety in Large Language Models

tasks, but remain vulnerable to safety risks such as harmful content generation and jailbreak attacks. Existing safety techniques -- including external guardrails, inference-time guidance, and post-training alignment -- each face

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