296 results in 99ms
Paper 2605.13796v1

Backdoor Threats in Variational Quantum Circuits: Taxonomy, Attacks, and Defenses

survey of backdoor attacks in VQCs, covering data-poisoning, compiler-level, and quantum-native mechanisms. We formalize key terminology and threat models, and review existing attack strategies along with their

high relevance survey
Paper 2603.00711v1

IU: Imperceptible Universal Backdoor Attack

simultaneously controls all target classes with minimal poisoning while preserving stealth. Our key idea is to leverage graph convolutional networks (GCNs) to model inter-class relationships and generate class-specific

high relevance attack
Paper 2510.10932v4

DropVLA: An Action-Level Backdoor Attack on Vision-Language-Action Models

tuning. On OpenVLA-7B evaluated with LIBERO, vision-only poisoning achieves 98.67%-99.83% attack success rate (ASR) with only 0.31% poisoned episodes while preserving 98.50%-99.17% clean-task retention

high relevance attack
Paper 2604.04759v1

Your Agent, Their Asset: A Real-World Safety Analysis of OpenClaw

live OpenClaw instance across four backbone models (Claude Sonnet 4.5, Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.4). The results show that poisoning any single CIK dimension increases the average

medium relevance defense
Paper 2511.00446v1

ToxicTextCLIP: Text-Based Poisoning and Backdoor Attacks on CLIP Pre-training

Contrastive Language-Image Pretraining (CLIP) model has significantly advanced vision-language modeling by aligning image-text pairs from large-scale web data through self-supervised contrastive learning. Yet, its reliance

high relevance attack
Paper 2603.11501v2

KEPo: Knowledge Evolution Poison on Graph-based Retrieval-Augmented Generation

timeliness and accuracy of Large Language Model (LLM) generations. However, this reliance on external data introduces new attack surfaces. Attackers can inject poisoned texts into databases to manipulate LLMs into

medium relevance benchmark
Paper 2512.08289v2

MIRAGE: Misleading Retrieval-Augmented Generation via Black-box and Query-agnostic Poisoning Attacks

proposing MIRAGE, a novel multi-stage poisoning pipeline designed for strict black-box and query-agnostic environments. Operating on surrogate model feedback, MIRAGE functions as an automated optimization framework that

high relevance attack
Paper 2603.06263v1

SPOILER: TEE-Shielded DNN Partitioning of On-Device Secure Inference with Poison Learning

Deploying deep neural networks (DNNs) on edge devices exposes valuable intellectual property to model-stealing attacks. While TEE-shielded DNN partitioning (TSDP) mitigates this by isolating sensitive computations, existing paradigms

medium relevance attack
Paper 2510.18324v1

CryptoGuard: Lightweight Hybrid Detection and Response to Host-based Cryptojackers in Linux Cloud Environments

phase process, leveraging deep learning models to identify suspicious activity with high precision. To counter evasion techniques such as entry point poisoning and PID manipulation, CryptoGuard integrates targeted remediation mechanisms

low relevance defense
Paper 2602.03040v1

DF-LoGiT: Data-Free Logic-Gated Backdoor Attacks in Vision Transformers

backdoor attacks largely rely on poisoned-data training, while prior data-free attempts typically require synthetic-data fine-tuning or extra model components. This paper introduces Data-Free Logic-Gated

high relevance attack
Paper 2602.20193v1

When Backdoors Go Beyond Triggers: Semantic Drift in Diffusion Models Under Encoder Attacks

attacks on text-to-image (T2I) models primarily measure trigger activation and visual fidelity. We challenge this paradigm, demonstrating that encoder-side poisoning induces persistent, trigger-free semantic corruption that

high relevance attack
Paper 2604.13153v1

PatchPoison: Poisoning Multi-View Datasets to Degrade 3D Reconstruction

exploited to reconstruct detailed 3D models of scenes or objects without the owner's consent. We present PatchPoison, a lightweight dataset-poisoning method that prevents unauthorized 3D reconstruction. Unlike global

medium relevance benchmark
Paper 2510.17185v1

Robustness in Text-Attributed Graph Learning: Insights, Trade-offs, and New Defenses

based, and hybrid perturbations in both poisoning and evasion scenarios. Our extensive analysis reveals multiple findings, among which three are particularly noteworthy: 1) models have inherent robustness trade-offs between

medium relevance defense
Paper 2603.25310v1

On the Vulnerability of Deep Automatic Modulation Classifiers to Explainable Backdoor Threats

breaching multiple DL-based AMC models. The attack achieves high success rates for a wide range of SNR values and a small poisoning ratio

high relevance attack
Paper 2509.20324v1

RAG Security and Privacy: Formalizing the Threat Model and Attack Surface

knowledge, the first formal threat model for retrieval-RAG systems. We introduce a structured taxonomy of adversary types based on their access to model components and data, and we formally

high relevance attack
Paper 2510.26102v1

PEEL: A Poisoning-Exposing Encoding Theoretical Framework for Local Differential Privacy

widely adopted privacy-protection model in the Internet of Things (IoT) due to its lightweight, decentralized, and scalable nature. However, it is vulnerable to poisoning attacks, and existing defenses either

medium relevance attack
Paper 2604.21700v1

Stealthy Backdoor Attacks against LLMs Based on Natural Style Triggers

attack framework and pipeline. BadStyle leverages an LLM as a poisoned sample generator to construct natural and stealthy poisoned samples that carry imperceptible style-level triggers while preserving semantics

high relevance attack
Paper 2602.15671v1

Revisiting Backdoor Threat in Federated Instruction Tuning from a Signal Aggregation Perspective

vulnerabilities from low-concentration poisoned data distributed across the datasets of benign clients.} This scenario is increasingly common in federated instruction tuning for language models, which often rely on unverified

medium relevance benchmark
Paper 2604.01346v1

Safety, Security, and Cognitive Risks in World Models

risks. Adversaries can corrupt training data, poison latent representations, and exploit compounding rollout errors to cause catastrophic failures in safety-critical deployments. World model-equipped agents are more capable

medium relevance defense
Paper 2605.18930v1

OEP: Poisoning Self-Evolving LLM Agents via Locally Correct but Non-Transferable Experiences

Memory-augmented large language model (LLM) agents use iterative reflection and self-evolution to solve complex tasks, but these mechanisms introduce security risks. Existing agentic memory attacks require privileged access

medium relevance attack
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