CVE-2026-44549: open-webui: XSS via XLSX preview enables session hijack
GHSA-jwf8-pv5p-vhmc HIGH CISA: ATTENDOpen WebUI versions up to 0.7.2 contain a stored XSS vulnerability in the XLSX file preview feature — SheetJS converts spreadsheets to raw HTML without sanitization, and Open WebUI injects that output directly into the DOM via Svelte's unsafe `@html` directive, a CVSS 7.3 flaw with a public Python PoC and trivial exploitation bar. The shared-chat propagation vector is the critical differentiator: any low-privilege user can craft a weaponized XLSX that silently exfiltrates session tokens from localStorage when any recipient clicks preview, turning a single upload into a multi-victim credential harvest. Admin accounts face a compounded risk — the stolen token chain links to GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch, escalating this XSS to server-side RCE on the Open WebUI host and any connected LLM infrastructure. Patch to open-webui 0.8.0 immediately; if patching is delayed, disable file preview functionality, invalidate all active sessions, and monitor for anomalous outbound HTTP requests from browser sessions.
What is the risk?
HIGH. CVSS 7.3 with network-accessible attack vector, low complexity, and low privilege requirement makes this broadly exploitable across all Open WebUI multi-user deployments. A public Python PoC reduces exploitation to script-kiddie level with no specialized knowledge required. The admin RCE chain via GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch elevates effective organizational impact well beyond the base CVSS score. Enterprise deployments running Open WebUI as an internal AI gateway or LLM frontend face the highest aggregate risk given the concentration of privileged accounts on a single platform.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Open WebUI | pip | <= 0.7.2 | 0.8.0 |
Do you use Open WebUI? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
5 steps-
Patch: Upgrade to open-webui 0.8.0, which sanitizes SheetJS-generated HTML with DOMPurify before DOM insertion.
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Immediate workaround: If patching is blocked, disable the file preview tab in Open WebUI configuration or restrict XLSX uploads via WAF rules blocking the multipart file upload endpoint.
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Session hygiene: Invalidate all active sessions post-patching and force reauthentication for all users.
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Detection: Monitor for unexpected outbound HTTP requests from browser client IPs, especially POST requests to external domains initiated from the Open WebUI origin.
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Threat hunt: Audit all XLSX file attachments uploaded to shared chats before the patch date and identify recipients who may have clicked preview.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-44549?
Open WebUI versions up to 0.7.2 contain a stored XSS vulnerability in the XLSX file preview feature — SheetJS converts spreadsheets to raw HTML without sanitization, and Open WebUI injects that output directly into the DOM via Svelte's unsafe `@html` directive, a CVSS 7.3 flaw with a public Python PoC and trivial exploitation bar. The shared-chat propagation vector is the critical differentiator: any low-privilege user can craft a weaponized XLSX that silently exfiltrates session tokens from localStorage when any recipient clicks preview, turning a single upload into a multi-victim credential harvest. Admin accounts face a compounded risk — the stolen token chain links to GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch, escalating this XSS to server-side RCE on the Open WebUI host and any connected LLM infrastructure. Patch to open-webui 0.8.0 immediately; if patching is delayed, disable file preview functionality, invalidate all active sessions, and monitor for anomalous outbound HTTP requests from browser sessions.
Is CVE-2026-44549 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-44549 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2026-44549?
1. Patch: Upgrade to open-webui 0.8.0, which sanitizes SheetJS-generated HTML with DOMPurify before DOM insertion. 2. Immediate workaround: If patching is blocked, disable the file preview tab in Open WebUI configuration or restrict XLSX uploads via WAF rules blocking the multipart file upload endpoint. 3. Session hygiene: Invalidate all active sessions post-patching and force reauthentication for all users. 4. Detection: Monitor for unexpected outbound HTTP requests from browser client IPs, especially POST requests to external domains initiated from the Open WebUI origin. 5. Threat hunt: Audit all XLSX file attachments uploaded to shared chats before the patch date and identify recipients who may have clicked preview.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-44549?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: AI chat interfaces, Self-hosted LLM frontends, Enterprise AI gateways, Multi-user AI assistant platforms.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-44549?
CVE-2026-44549 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.3 (HIGH). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.32%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0011 User Execution AML.T0011.000 Unsafe AI Artifacts AML.T0043.003 Manual Modification AML.T0048.003 User Harm AML.T0049 Exploit Public-Facing Application AML.T0055 Unsecured Credentials AML.T0091.000 Application Access Token Compliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
### Summary Excel file attachments are previewed in an unsafe way. A crafted XLSX file payload can be used to cause the [sheetjs](https://git.sheetjs.com/sheetjs/sheetjs) function [sheet_to_html](https://git.sheetjs.com/sheetjs/sheetjs/src/commit/66cf8d2117d271f89e4f47b5fed35a3e1ea93f67/bits/79_html.js#L127) to embed an XSS payload into the generated HTML. This is subsequently added to the DOM unsanitized via [`@html`](https://svelte.dev/docs/svelte/@html) causing the payload to trigger. ### Details The function used to convert XLSX documents to HTML for preview does not perform any input validation or sanitisation for the generated HTML https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/a7271532f8a38da46785afcaa7e65f9a45e7d753/src/lib/components/common/FileItemModal.svelte#L120-L133 XLSX attachments are processed by this function, converted to HTML with `XLSX.utils.sheet_to_html` before ultimately being assigned to the variable `excelHtml`. Later there is logic that causes this to be assigned directly to the DOM when the preview tab is selected. https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/a7271532f8a38da46785afcaa7e65f9a45e7d753/src/lib/components/common/FileItemModal.svelte#L358-L400 ### PoC A python script to generate a payload file is as follows: ```python import xlsxwriter payload = '<img src=x onerror="alert(\'XSS Triggered by XLSX file\')">' workbook = xlsxwriter.Workbook('xss_payload.xlsx') worksheet = workbook.add_worksheet() payload_format = workbook.add_format() worksheet.write_rich_string('A1', 'This cell contains a hidden payload: ', payload_format, payload ) worksheet.write('A2', 'This is a safe cell.') worksheet.write('B1', 'Column B') workbook.close() ``` Upload the generated file as an attachment to a chat, open the file modal, and click preview. Observe the XSS triggers. <img width="2444" height="1386" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8400efb0-ea6f-4878-abdb-4c2fe529241f" /> This same process can be triggered in shared chats, allowing the payload to be distributed to victims. <img width="2386" height="1646" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d0eda49c-8fcf-4fc4-bbb0-c8951b0369c3" /> ### Impact Any user can create a weaponised chat that can be shared and subsequently used to target other users. Low privilege users are at risk of having their session taken over by a payload that reads their token from local storage and exfiltrates it to an attacker controlled server. Admins are at risk of exposing the server to RCE via same chain described in GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch. ### Caveats The file attachment in the shared chat must be opened and previewed to trigger the vulnerability. ### Recommendation Sanitise the generated HTML with DOMPurify before assigning it to the DOM.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker with a standard Open WebUI user account uses the public Python PoC to generate a weaponized XLSX file containing an `<img src=x onerror=...>` payload that reads the JWT from localStorage and POSTs it to an attacker-controlled server. The attacker creates a shared chat, attaches the file, and distributes the link to high-value targets including admins via internal Slack or email. When an admin clicks Preview in the file modal, the XSS fires silently. The attacker receives the admin session token, replays it against the Open WebUI API, and chains the admin access with GHSA-w7xj-8fx7-wfch to achieve RCE on the server, from which they can exfiltrate API keys for connected LLMs, access RAG database contents, and pivot to internal infrastructure.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-79 — Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting'): The product does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes user-controllable input before it is placed in output that is used as a web page that is served to other users.
- [Architecture and Design] Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. Examples of libraries and frameworks that make it easier to generate properly encoded output include Microsoft's Anti-XSS library, the OWASP ESAPI Encoding module, and Apache Wicket.
- [Implementation, Architecture and Design] Understand the context in which your data will be used and the encoding that will be expected. This is especially important when transmitting data between different components, or when generating outputs that can contain multiple encodings at the same time, such as web pages or multi-part mail messages. Study all expected communication protocols and data representations to determine the required encoding strategies. For any data that will be output to another web page, especially any data that was received from external inputs, use the appropriate encoding on all non-alphanumeric characters. Parts of the same output document may require different encodings, which will vary depending on whether the output is in the: etc. Note that HTML Entity Encoding is only appropriate for the HTML body. Consult the XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet [REF-724] for more details on the types of encoding and escaping that are needed. HTML body Element attributes (such as src="XYZ") URIs JavaScript sections Casca
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N References
Timeline
Related Vulnerabilities
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