Any authenticated user on open-webui ≤0.8.12 can bypass administrator-enforced model-tier restrictions by posting directly to `/api/openai/responses`, which proxies requests to upstream LLM providers without checking model ownership, group membership, or AccessGrants — the full authorization stack applied on every other endpoint is silently skipped. The practical blast radius hits shared enterprise deployments hardest: a single low-privileged user can rack up charges against expensive restricted models (GPT-4o, o1-pro) or repeatedly query proprietary fine-tuned models for capability distillation, with no audit trail distinguishing authorized from unauthorized use. With no public exploit code and no KEV listing this is not actively weaponized, but the attack requires only a valid session and basic HTTP knowledge — making it executable by any frustrated user or low-sophistication insider. Upgrade to open-webui 0.9.0 immediately; if patching is blocked, add a reverse-proxy rule blocking `/api/openai/responses` for non-admin sessions and audit upstream API cost logs for anomalies.
What is the risk?
High risk for any multi-tenant or shared open-webui deployment acting as an LLM gateway. CVSS 7.1 reflects low attack complexity, network exposure, and low-privilege requirement — no special tooling or AI knowledge needed. The package carries 52 prior CVEs suggesting a chronic security posture concern. Financial impact is the primary acute risk: unrestricted access to frontier models can drain API budgets rapidly. Secondary risk is IP exposure for organizations proxying proprietary fine-tuned models. Single-user deployments are unaffected since access control enforcement only matters in shared contexts.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Open WebUI | pip | <= 0.8.12 | 0.9.0 |
Do you use Open WebUI? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
1 step-
1) Upgrade to open-webui 0.9.0 which patches the missing authorization check on
/api/openai/responses. 2) If immediate upgrade is not feasible, restrict/api/openai/responsesat the reverse proxy or WAF layer to admin-role sessions only, or block the endpoint entirely until patched. 3) Audit server access logs for unexpected calls to/api/openai/responsesfrom non-admin users, especially with high-cost model IDs. 4) Review upstream provider (OpenAI, Anthropic) API usage dashboards for anomalous cost spikes that may indicate prior exploitation. 5) Rotate upstream API keys if cost anomalies are detected. 6) Implement API spend alerts at the upstream provider level as a compensating control.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-44556?
Any authenticated user on open-webui ≤0.8.12 can bypass administrator-enforced model-tier restrictions by posting directly to `/api/openai/responses`, which proxies requests to upstream LLM providers without checking model ownership, group membership, or AccessGrants — the full authorization stack applied on every other endpoint is silently skipped. The practical blast radius hits shared enterprise deployments hardest: a single low-privileged user can rack up charges against expensive restricted models (GPT-4o, o1-pro) or repeatedly query proprietary fine-tuned models for capability distillation, with no audit trail distinguishing authorized from unauthorized use. With no public exploit code and no KEV listing this is not actively weaponized, but the attack requires only a valid session and basic HTTP knowledge — making it executable by any frustrated user or low-sophistication insider. Upgrade to open-webui 0.9.0 immediately; if patching is blocked, add a reverse-proxy rule blocking `/api/openai/responses` for non-admin sessions and audit upstream API cost logs for anomalies.
Is CVE-2026-44556 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-44556 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2026-44556?
1) Upgrade to open-webui 0.9.0 which patches the missing authorization check on `/api/openai/responses`. 2) If immediate upgrade is not feasible, restrict `/api/openai/responses` at the reverse proxy or WAF layer to admin-role sessions only, or block the endpoint entirely until patched. 3) Audit server access logs for unexpected calls to `/api/openai/responses` from non-admin users, especially with high-cost model IDs. 4) Review upstream provider (OpenAI, Anthropic) API usage dashboards for anomalous cost spikes that may indicate prior exploitation. 5) Rotate upstream API keys if cost anomalies are detected. 6) Implement API spend alerts at the upstream provider level as a compensating control.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-44556?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: LLM gateway and proxy deployments, Multi-tenant AI platforms, Model serving, Enterprise AI portals, Fine-tuned model hosting.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-44556?
CVE-2026-44556 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.1 (HIGH). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.31%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0012 Valid Accounts AML.T0024.002 Extract AI Model AML.T0034 Cost Harvesting AML.T0034.001 Resource-Intensive Queries AML.T0040 AI Model Inference API Access AML.T0048.000 Financial Harm AML.T0048.004 AI Intellectual Property Theft AML.T0049 Exploit Public-Facing Application Compliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
Open WebUI is a self-hosted artificial intelligence platform designed to operate entirely offline. Prior to 0.9.0, the /responses endpoint in the OpenAI router accepts any authenticated user and forwards requests directly to upstream LLM providers without enforcing per-model access control. While the primary chat completion endpoint (generate_chat_completion) checks model ownership, group membership, and AccessGrants before allowing a request, the /responses proxy only validates that the user has a valid session via get_verified_user. This allows any authenticated user to interact with any model configured on the instance by sending a POST request to /api/openai/responses with an arbitrary model ID. This vulnerability is fixed in 0.9.0.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker with a standard authenticated session on a shared enterprise open-webui instance — perhaps a contractor with limited model access — discovers the `/api/openai/responses` endpoint through API documentation or simple endpoint enumeration. They craft a POST request with their session token specifying `o1-pro` or another restricted expensive model in the payload body. The server, performing only session validity checks, forwards the request to the upstream OpenAI API billed to the organization's key. By scripting thousands of resource-intensive inference requests, the attacker exhausts the organization's API budget or hits rate limits, causing a complete denial of service for all legitimate users. Alternatively, if the instance proxies a proprietary fine-tuned model, the attacker can systematically query it to distill its behavior into a local proxy model, effectively stealing the IP without triggering any access-control alerts.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-284 Improper Access Control
Primary
CWE-284 Improper Access Control
Primary
CWE-862 Missing Authorization
Primary
CWE-862 Missing Authorization
Primary
CWE-284 — Improper Access Control: The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
- [Architecture and Design, Operation] Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
- [Architecture and Design] Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H References
Timeline
Related Vulnerabilities
CVE-2026-44551 9.1 open-webui: LDAP auth bypass — full account takeover
Same package: open-webui CVE-2026-45672 8.8 open-webui: code exec gate bypass via API endpoint
Same package: open-webui CVE-2026-44552 8.7 open-webui: Redis cache poisoning enables cross-instance tool hijack
Same package: open-webui CVE-2025-64495 8.7 Open WebUI: XSS-to-RCE via malicious prompt injection
Same package: open-webui CVE-2026-45315 8.7 open-webui: stored XSS → JWT theft and admin takeover
Same package: open-webui