CVE-2026-44564

GHSA-vrfh-rj4q-rmhr MEDIUM
Published May 8, 2026

# Read-Only Users Can Modify Collaborative Documents via Socket.IO ## Affected Component Socket.IO collaborative document editing handler: - `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` (lines 667-721, `ydoc:document:update` handler) ## Affected Versions Current main branch and likely all versions with...

Full CISO analysis pending enrichment.

Affected Systems

Package Ecosystem Vulnerable Range Patched
open-webui pip <= 0.8.12 0.9.0
135.3K Pushed 8d ago 58% patched ~9d to patch Full package profile →

Do you use open-webui? You're affected.

Severity & Risk

CVSS 3.1
5.4 / 10
EPSS
N/A
Exploitation Status
No known exploitation
Sophistication
N/A

Attack Surface

AV AC PR UI S C I A
AV Network
AC Low
PR Low
UI None
S Unchanged
C None
I Low
A Low

Recommended Action

Patch available

Update open-webui to version 0.9.0

Compliance Impact

Compliance analysis pending. Sign in for full compliance mapping when available.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-44564?

Read-Only Open WebUI Users Can Modify Collaborative Documents via Socket.IO

Is CVE-2026-44564 actively exploited?

No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-44564 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.

How to fix CVE-2026-44564?

Update to patched version: open-webui 0.9.0.

What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-44564?

CVE-2026-44564 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.4 (MEDIUM).

Technical Details

NVD Description

# Read-Only Users Can Modify Collaborative Documents via Socket.IO ## Affected Component Socket.IO collaborative document editing handler: - `backend/open_webui/socket/main.py` (lines 667-721, `ydoc:document:update` handler) ## Affected Versions Current main branch and likely all versions with collaborative note editing. ## Description The `ydoc:document:update` Socket.IO event handler checks whether the sender is a member of the document's Socket.IO room (line 678) but does not verify that the sender has **write** permission. Users with read-only access join the document room via `ydoc:document:join`, which only requires `read` permission (line 520). Once in the room, the user can emit `ydoc:document:update` events that modify the in-memory Yjs document state and are broadcast to all other collaborators in real time. The `document_save_handler` (line 600) correctly checks `write` permission before persisting to the database, so the attacker cannot directly save changes. However, the tampered content is visible to all collaborators, and if any user with write access saves the document, the injected content is persisted. ```python # ydoc:document:update handler (line 667) — only checks room membership, not write permission async def on_document_update(sid, data): document_id = normalize_document_id(data.get('document_id', '')) # ... room = f'doc_{document_id}' if room not in sio.rooms(sid): # Room membership check only return # Applies update to Yjs state and broadcasts to all users YDOC_MANAGER.apply_update(document_id, update) await sio.emit('ydoc:document:update', {...}, room=room, skip_sid=sid) ``` Compare with `ydoc:document:join` (line 520) which checks permission: ```python # Only checks READ permission — so read-only users join the room if not has_access(user_id, type, id, 'read', db=db): return ``` ## CVSS 3.1 Breakdown | Metric | Value | Rationale | |--------|-------|-----------| | Attack Vector | Network (N) | Exploited remotely via Socket.IO events | | Attack Complexity | Low (L) | No special conditions; attacker emits a standard Socket.IO event | | Privileges Required | Low (L) | Requires a valid user account with read access to the shared note | | User Interaction | None (N) | Modifications appear in real time without victim action; however, persistence requires a write-access user to save | | Scope | Unchanged (U) | Impact is within the collaborative document context | | Confidentiality | None (N) | No data disclosure beyond what read access already provides | | Integrity | Low (L) | In-memory document state is modified and broadcast; persistence is indirect (requires another user to save) | | Availability | Low (L) | Collaborative editing session can be disrupted with invalid content | ## Attack Scenario 1. User A creates a note and shares it with User B with **read** permission. 2. User B opens the note, which triggers `ydoc:document:join` — the server checks read permission and adds User B to the document room. 3. User B emits `ydoc:document:update` with a crafted Yjs update payload via the Socket.IO connection (bypassing any frontend read-only enforcement). 4. The server applies the update to the Yjs document state and broadcasts it to all collaborators. 5. User A sees the injected content appear in their editor in real time. 6. If User A saves the document (intentionally or via autosave), the tampered content is persisted to the database — User A's save passes the write permission check since User A is the owner. ## Impact - Read-only users can inject, modify, or delete content in collaborative documents - Modifications are broadcast in real time to all collaborators, causing confusion or disruption - If a write-access user saves (including autosave), the tampered content is permanently persisted - Undermines the read/write permission model for collaborative editing ## Preconditions - Attacker must have a valid user account with read access to a shared note - The note must be open for collaborative editing (at least one other user viewing it, or the attacker can wait for a write-access user to open and save)

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

Timeline

Published
May 8, 2026
Last Modified
May 8, 2026
First Seen
May 9, 2026

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