Open WebUI's sign-in endpoint ran bcrypt verification only when the submitted email matched a registered account, making valid emails respond measurably slower than invalid ones and letting an unauthenticated attacker enumerate which accounts exist on a self-hosted deployment. This doesn't grant access, leak passwords, or execute code — the blast radius is reconnaissance, not compromise — and exploitation likelihood is low: EPSS sits at 0.24% (top 84th percentile of scored CVEs, but a small absolute number), with no public exploit, no Nuclei template, and no CISA KEV listing. The practical danger is that confirmed usernames/emails become fuel for downstream credential stuffing, targeted phishing, or password-guessing against instances lacking login rate limits — a meaningful concern given Open WebUI fronts LLM chat access for teams and individuals. Patch to Open WebUI 0.10.0, which normalizes response timing regardless of account existence; until upgraded, put rate limiting or a WAF rule in front of /api/v1/auths/signin and alert on bursts of sign-in attempts cycling through different emails from one source.
What is the risk?
Low-to-medium risk in practice despite CVSS 5.3 (network, low complexity, no privileges/UI needed). Impact is confidentiality-only (C:L, no integrity/availability effect) and limited to disclosing account existence, not credentials or session data. Exploitability is trivial (basic timing measurement, no special tooling), but the EPSS score (0.24%, ~84th percentile) reflects that few attackers prioritize enumeration bugs absent a chained credential-stuffing campaign. No KEV listing, no public exploit code, and no scanner template further reduce urgency. Exposure is proportional to how many Open WebUI instances are internet-facing without login throttling — self-hosted deployments run by smaller teams are more likely to lack that control.
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| Open WebUI | pip | < 0.10.0 | 0.10.0 |
Do you use Open WebUI? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
1 step-
Upgrade to Open WebUI 0.10.0 or later, which fixes the timing side-channel per GHSA-7rw5-9f7q-xj36 (commit 993e749). If immediate upgrade isn't possible: (1) add rate limiting/throttling in front of /api/v1/auths/signin (reverse proxy or WAF) to blunt automated enumeration sweeps; (2) enforce a consistent response-time floor at the proxy layer (e.g., artificial delay) as a stopgap; (3) monitor auth logs for high-volume sign-in attempts against many distinct emails from a single IP/session — a signature of enumeration; (4) if the instance is internet-facing without a business need, restrict it behind VPN or IP allowlisting.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-59218?
Open WebUI's sign-in endpoint ran bcrypt verification only when the submitted email matched a registered account, making valid emails respond measurably slower than invalid ones and letting an unauthenticated attacker enumerate which accounts exist on a self-hosted deployment. This doesn't grant access, leak passwords, or execute code — the blast radius is reconnaissance, not compromise — and exploitation likelihood is low: EPSS sits at 0.24% (top 84th percentile of scored CVEs, but a small absolute number), with no public exploit, no Nuclei template, and no CISA KEV listing. The practical danger is that confirmed usernames/emails become fuel for downstream credential stuffing, targeted phishing, or password-guessing against instances lacking login rate limits — a meaningful concern given Open WebUI fronts LLM chat access for teams and individuals. Patch to Open WebUI 0.10.0, which normalizes response timing regardless of account existence; until upgraded, put rate limiting or a WAF rule in front of /api/v1/auths/signin and alert on bursts of sign-in attempts cycling through different emails from one source.
Is CVE-2026-59218 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-59218 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2026-59218?
Upgrade to Open WebUI 0.10.0 or later, which fixes the timing side-channel per GHSA-7rw5-9f7q-xj36 (commit 993e749). If immediate upgrade isn't possible: (1) add rate limiting/throttling in front of /api/v1/auths/signin (reverse proxy or WAF) to blunt automated enumeration sweeps; (2) enforce a consistent response-time floor at the proxy layer (e.g., artificial delay) as a stopgap; (3) monitor auth logs for high-volume sign-in attempts against many distinct emails from a single IP/session — a signature of enumeration; (4) if the instance is internet-facing without a business need, restrict it behind VPN or IP allowlisting.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-59218?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: self-hosted LLM chat UI platforms, model serving front-ends.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-59218?
CVE-2026-59218 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 5.3 (MEDIUM). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.41%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0012 Valid Accounts Compliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
Open WebUI is an extensible, feature-rich, and user-friendly self-hosted AI platform. Prior to 0.10.0, the /api/v1/auths/signin endpoint looked users up by email and only ran bcrypt password verification when a credential existed, making registered-account attempts measurably slower than missing-email attempts and allowing unauthenticated account enumeration. This issue is fixed in version 0.10.0.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker targeting an organization that self-hosts Open WebUI for internal LLM access scripts repeated POST requests to /api/v1/auths/signin, cycling through likely corporate email addresses (harvested from LinkedIn, breach dumps, or naming conventions) with a fixed bogus password. By measuring response latency — slower responses indicate a bcrypt comparison ran, meaning the email is registered — the attacker builds a confirmed list of valid accounts without ever triggering a failed-login alert tied to a real user. That list is then handed off to a credential-stuffing run using leaked password dumps, or used to craft targeted phishing emails referencing the victim's known use of the internal AI platform, significantly improving the success rate of the follow-on attack.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-208 — Observable Timing Discrepancy: Two separate operations in a product require different amounts of time to complete, in a way that is observable to an actor and reveals security-relevant information about the state of the product, such as whether a particular operation was successful or not.
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N References
- github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/993e74912199c66c522f08ec81abe31d76985e39 x_refsource_MISC
- github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/26385 x_refsource_MISC
- github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0 x_refsource_MISC
- github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-7rw5-9f7q-xj36 x_refsource_CONFIRM
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-7rw5-9f7q-xj36
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59218
Timeline
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