MCP Atlassian, a Model Context Protocol server that lets AI agents reach Jira and Confluence, skips its SSRF-protection hook on sessions created through the basic-auth and oauth_pat code paths, so it follows HTTP redirects to internal addresses without revalidating them. Exploitation requires a malicious or compromised Atlassian instance that the server is configured to talk to, which keeps the CVSS at 7.1 (high attack complexity, scope changed). Real-world pressure is low: EPSS is 0.00321 (77th percentile), there is no public exploit, no Nuclei template, it is not in CISA KEV, and CISA SSVC says TRACK. Blast radius is limited (1 downstream dependent), but the package has 38 other CVEs, so it is a recurring-risk component. Upgrade mcp-atlassian to 0.22.0 or later, and verify that agent hosts running it cannot reach cloud metadata endpoints or internal admin services.
What is the risk?
Medium-to-high for organizations running mcp-atlassian against self-hosted or third-party Atlassian instances. The attack needs a hostile or compromised upstream instance (high complexity) and low privileges, but the changed scope and high confidentiality impact mean that a successful redirect to internal services (cloud metadata, internal APIs) can expose credentials and data beyond the vulnerable component. Exploitation likelihood is low (EPSS 0.00321, no public exploit, not in KEV, SSVC TRACK).
How does the attack unfold?
What systems are affected?
| Package | Ecosystem | Vulnerable Range | Patched |
|---|---|---|---|
| MCP Atlassian | pip | < 0.22.0 | 0.22.0 |
Do you use MCP Atlassian? You're affected.
How severe is it?
What is the attack surface?
What should I do?
1 step1) Upgrade mcp-atlassian to 0.22.0 or later (fix in PR #1448, commit b041733). 2) Until patched, restrict egress from the MCP host: block access to link-local/metadata addresses (169.254.169.254), RFC1918 ranges, and localhost except for required destinations. 3) Enforce IMDSv2 or equivalent metadata protections on cloud hosts. 4) Only point the server at trusted, verified Atlassian instances and review the configured base URLs. 5) Monitor outbound connections from the MCP process to internal ranges and log unexpected 3xx redirect chains from Atlassian endpoints. 6) Run the MCP server with least-privilege network and credential scope.
What does CISA's SSVC say?
Source: CISA Vulnrichment (SSVC v2.0). Decision based on the CISA Coordinator decision tree.
How is it classified?
Which compliance frameworks are affected?
This CVE is relevant to:
Frequently Asked Questions
What is CVE-2026-77261?
MCP Atlassian, a Model Context Protocol server that lets AI agents reach Jira and Confluence, skips its SSRF-protection hook on sessions created through the basic-auth and oauth_pat code paths, so it follows HTTP redirects to internal addresses without revalidating them. Exploitation requires a malicious or compromised Atlassian instance that the server is configured to talk to, which keeps the CVSS at 7.1 (high attack complexity, scope changed). Real-world pressure is low: EPSS is 0.00321 (77th percentile), there is no public exploit, no Nuclei template, it is not in CISA KEV, and CISA SSVC says TRACK. Blast radius is limited (1 downstream dependent), but the package has 38 other CVEs, so it is a recurring-risk component. Upgrade mcp-atlassian to 0.22.0 or later, and verify that agent hosts running it cannot reach cloud metadata endpoints or internal admin services.
Is CVE-2026-77261 actively exploited?
No confirmed active exploitation of CVE-2026-77261 has been reported, but organizations should still patch proactively.
How to fix CVE-2026-77261?
1) Upgrade mcp-atlassian to 0.22.0 or later (fix in PR #1448, commit b041733). 2) Until patched, restrict egress from the MCP host: block access to link-local/metadata addresses (169.254.169.254), RFC1918 ranges, and localhost except for required destinations. 3) Enforce IMDSv2 or equivalent metadata protections on cloud hosts. 4) Only point the server at trusted, verified Atlassian instances and review the configured base URLs. 5) Monitor outbound connections from the MCP process to internal ranges and log unexpected 3xx redirect chains from Atlassian endpoints. 6) Run the MCP server with least-privilege network and credential scope.
What systems are affected by CVE-2026-77261?
This vulnerability affects the following AI/ML architecture patterns: agent frameworks, MCP servers, tool-calling AI agents, enterprise knowledge integrations.
What is the CVSS score for CVE-2026-77261?
CVE-2026-77261 has a CVSS v3.1 base score of 7.1 (HIGH). The EPSS exploitation probability is 0.37%.
What is the AI security impact?
Affected AI Architectures
MITRE ATLAS Techniques
AML.T0010.005AI Agent ToolAML.T0053AI Agent Tool InvocationAML.T0085.001AI Agent ToolsCompliance Controls Affected
What are the technical details?
Original Advisory
MCP Atlassian is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, _make_ssrf_safe_hook is omitted from JiraFetcher and ConfluenceFetcher sessions created through the basic-auth and oauth_pat branches. If an attacker-controlled or compromised configured Atlassian instance returns a redirect to an internal address, those sessions can follow the redirect without revalidating its destination. This issue is fixed in version 0.22.0.
Exploitation Scenario
An attacker compromises, or convinces a user to configure, an Atlassian instance URL they control (for example a rogue self-hosted Confluence). When an AI agent invokes a Jira or Confluence tool through mcp-atlassian using basic-auth or OAuth PAT, the attacker's server answers with a redirect to an internal address such as the cloud metadata service. The vulnerable session follows the redirect without revalidation and returns the response to the fetcher, exposing instance credentials or internal service data that the attacker can then use for lateral movement.
Weaknesses (CWE)
CWE-918 — Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF): The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
- [Implementation, Operation] If there is a known list of applications, IP, hostname, and/or domains to which the product is allowed to communicate, then use allowlists to ensure that outgoing requests are restricted to these known entities. The allowlists could be in the application code or possibly enforced by firewalls or network segmentation [REF-1511].
- [Implementation, Operation] If the product is expected to be able to connect to arbitrary IP addresses or domains, consider using a denylist that includes private network addresses, internal domain names, etc. The denylist could be in the application code or possibly enforced by firewalls or network segmentation [REF-1511].
Source: MITRE CWE corpus.
CVSS Vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:NReferences
- github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/commit/b041733473f95119dd539542a43c280737a8e460x_refsource_MISC
- github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/pull/1448x_refsource_MISC
- github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/releases/tag/v0.22.0x_refsource_MISC
- github.com/sooperset/mcp-atlassian/security/advisories/GHSA-6529-c226-h328x_refsource_CONFIRM
- github.com/advisories/GHSA-6529-c226-h328
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77261
Timeline
Related Vulnerabilities
CVE-2026-7724410.0MCP Atlassian: unauthenticated access to operator Jira/Confluence
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Same package: mcp-atlassianCVE-2026-772438.8MCP Atlassian: missing authz lets clients call hidden tools
Same package: mcp-atlassianCVE-2026-772628.6mcp-atlassian: path traversal enables arbitrary file read
Same package: mcp-atlassian