Code Execution
Remote code execution is unusually common in the AI/ML ecosystem because two long-standing patterns persist: pickle-based model loading and Jinja-style template rendering. Pickle is Python's default serialisation format and it executes arbitrary code on deserialisation; PyTorch models, scikit-learn pipelines, and many older HuggingFace artefacts are pickle files, so loading an untrusted model file is equivalent to running an untrusted script. HuggingFace addressed this with safetensors, but the older format is still widespread. The second pattern is template injection in LLM application frameworks that render Jinja-like syntax inside user-controlled prompts; LangChain, LlamaIndex, and several agent frameworks have shipped CVEs of this shape. Inference servers (vLLM, Triton, BentoML, Ray Serve) round out the RCE landscape with the usual web-app issues. Defenses: never load model files from untrusted sources, prefer safetensors, sandbox inference, and audit any code path that combines user input with template rendering.
| Severity | CVE | Headline | Package | CVSS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HIGH | CVE-2026-61434 | PraisonAI: allowlist bypass enables RCE via find -exec | praisonai | 8.8 |
| HIGH | CVE-2026-61437 | PraisonAI: unsafe dynamic import enables RCE | praisonaiagents | 7.8 |
| CRITICAL | CVE-2026-61444 | PraisonAI: code injection via f-string in deploy API | praisonai | 9.1 |
| MEDIUM | CVE-2026-8595 | Grafana: stored XSS via malicious TableNG field name | 6.8 | |
| HIGH | CVE-2026-54070 | SiYuan: XSS in Bazaar README steals admin API token | github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel | 7.1 |
| CRITICAL | CVE-2026-61447 | PraisonAI: RCE via unsandboxed LLM code execution | praisonai | 10.0 |
| CRITICAL | CVE-2026-61445 | PraisonAI: AICoder root RCE via unsanitized tool calls | praisonai | 9.9 |
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