Attack Type

Supply Chain

AI/ML systems sit on a long dependency chain: package managers (PyPI, npm, Cargo), model registries (HuggingFace Hub, Ollama Library), and dataset repositories. Each is a viable attack surface. Common patterns include typosquatting of popular AI packages, malicious post-install scripts in npm/PyPI uploads, and unsafe deserialization in shared model files — PyTorch and pickle-based formats can execute arbitrary code on load, which is why HuggingFace introduced the safer safetensors format. Model-registry attacks have included planting backdoored fine-tunes of popular base models that pass benchmark eval but misbehave on attacker-chosen triggers. Dataset poisoning is the slowest variant: an attacker who can influence a public training corpus inserts content that later teaches downstream models a backdoor. Defenses: pinned versions, signature verification, safetensors over pickle, provenance attestation (SLSA), and scanning model files before load.

965
Total CVEs
49
Pages
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Current
SeverityCVECVSS
CRITICALCVE-2024-90709.8
CRITICALCVE-2025-275209.8
CRITICALCVE-2025-323759.8
CRITICALCVE-2025-543819.9
MEDIUMCVE-2026-241236.5
HIGHCVE-2025-51737.8
HIGHCVE-2025-627268.8
HIGHCVE-2025-659648.8
CRITICALCVE-2026-218779.9
CRITICALCVE-2026-333099.9
CRITICALCVE-2026-334759.1
HIGHCVE-2026-332368.1
HIGHCVE-2026-33155-
MEDIUMGHSA-5cxw-w2xg-2m8h-
CRITICALCVE-2026-278259.1
MEDIUMCVE-2026-282776.8
HIGHGHSA-5r2p-pjr8-7fh7-
HIGHGHSA-5hwf-rc88-82xm-
HIGHGHSA-wccx-j62j-r448-
CRITICALGHSA-g38g-8gr9-h9xp9.8

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