Attack Type

Supply Chain

AI/ML systems sit on a long dependency chain: package managers (PyPI, npm, Cargo), model registries (HuggingFace Hub, Ollama Library), and dataset repositories. Each is a viable attack surface. Common patterns include typosquatting of popular AI packages, malicious post-install scripts in npm/PyPI uploads, and unsafe deserialization in shared model files — PyTorch and pickle-based formats can execute arbitrary code on load, which is why HuggingFace introduced the safer safetensors format. Model-registry attacks have included planting backdoored fine-tunes of popular base models that pass benchmark eval but misbehave on attacker-chosen triggers. Dataset poisoning is the slowest variant: an attacker who can influence a public training corpus inserts content that later teaches downstream models a backdoor. Defenses: pinned versions, signature verification, safetensors over pickle, provenance attestation (SLSA), and scanning model files before load.

965
Total CVEs
49
Pages
Page 17 of 49
Current
SeverityCVECVSS
HIGHCVE-2025-64439-
HIGHCVE-2025-77077.1
CRITICALGHSA-m9mp-6x32-5rhg-
MEDIUMCVE-2025-89175.8
HIGHCVE-2025-304028.1
HIGHCVE-2025-76477.3
HIGHCVE-2025-587578.8
HIGHCVE-2025-587568.8
HIGHCVE-2025-587558.8
LOWCVE-2025-59842-
HIGHCVE-2025-101567.5
HIGHCVE-2025-101578.3
MEDIUMGHSA-q77w-mwjj-7mqx-
MEDIUMGHSA-49gj-c84q-6qm9-
MEDIUMGHSA-9w88-8rmg-7g2p-
MEDIUMGHSA-fqq6-7vqf-w3fg-
MEDIUMGHSA-3gf5-cxq9-w223-
MEDIUMGHSA-j343-8v2j-ff7w-
MEDIUMGHSA-m869-42cg-3xwr-
MEDIUMGHSA-p9w7-82w4-7q8m-

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