Open WebUI: Path traversal / SSRF in terminal server proxy via encoded path traversal
Budibase: SSRF via OAuth2 Config Validation — Missing fetchWithBlacklist Protection
MCP Atlassian: MCP HTTP Client Server-Local File Exfiltration via
server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, validate_url_for_ssrf checks a hostname's resolved addresses, but Requests and urllib3 resolve the hostname again when connecting
NLTK: pathsec SSRF protection can be bypassed when a proxy is configured
OpenAI-compatible API multimodal media URL handler that allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass SSRF validation. The check_ssrf_url guard validates URLs once but requests.get follows redirects and re-resolves
protection bypass vulnerability in the MCP Client node that allows authenticated users to bypass SSRF protections. Attackers can craft workflows that send requests to internal or blocked hosts without routing
Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.9.6 contains a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). The legacy RSSReaderComponent in rss.py and SearXNG component in searxng.py make unvalidated HTTP requests to user-controlled URLs
Budibase: SSRF in AI Extract File Automation Step via Missing IP Blacklist Validation
Open WebUI has a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass in `validate
Zalo plugin's sendPhoto function that fails to validate outbound photo URLs through the SSRF guard. Attackers can bypass SSRF protection by providing malicious photo URLs to the Zalo
powered applications. Prior to version 1.1.8, a redirect-based Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass exists in `RecursiveUrlLoader` in `@langchain/community`. The loader validates the initial URL but allows the underlying
Open WebUI vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Arbitrary URL Processing in /api/v1/retrieval/process/web
source, AI chat framework. Versions of lobe-chat prior to 1.19.13 have an unauthorized ssrf vulnerability. An attacker can construct malicious requests to cause SSRF without logging in, attack intranet
CodeWhale: SSRF bypass - TOCTOU on DNS failure for DNS pinning
IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses bypass SSRF protection in validateUrlSync(), enabling full SSRF for SDK embedders
PraisonAI Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery via Unvalidated webhook
OpenClaw: SSRF via Unguarded Configured Base URLs in Multiple Channel Extensions (Incomplete
controlled AI provider URL directly to LiteLLM without applying the server's outbound-request SSRF checks when an authenticated user creates a Space, configures an AI provider with