Local Deep Research is Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Download Service
Flowise: SSRF Protection Bypass via Unprotected Built-in HTTP Modules in Custom Function Sandbox
Atlassian has SSRF via unvalidated X-Atlassian-Jira-Url / X-Atlassian-Confluence-Url headers
Flowise: SSRF Protection Bypass via Direct node-fetch / axios Usage (Patch Enforcement Failure
customized large language model flow. Prior to 3.1.0, a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) protection bypass vulnerability exists in the Custom Function feature. While the application implements SSRF protection
Flowise: APIChain Prompt Injection SSRF in GET/POST API Chains
LangChain Text Splitters: HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url SSRF Redirect Bypass
OpenClaw: QQBot reply media URL handling could trigger SSRF and re-upload fetched bytes
langchain-openai: Image token counting SSRF protection can be bypassed via DNS rebinding
OpenClaw: SSRF via Unguarded `fetch()` in Marketplace Plugin Download and Ollama Model Discovery
vLLM is an inference and serving engine for large language models (LLMs). The SSRF protection fix for CVE-2026-24779 add in 0.15.1 can be bypassed in the load_from
powered applications. Prior to version 1.1.8, a redirect-based Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass exists in `RecursiveUrlLoader` in `@langchain/community`. The loader validates the initial URL but allows the underlying
Open WebUI vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Arbitrary URL Processing in /api/v1/retrieval/process/web
mode=True, is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability stems from the way the StringLookup layer is handled during model loading from
source, AI chat framework. Versions of lobe-chat prior to 1.19.13 have an unauthorized ssrf vulnerability. An attacker can construct malicious requests to cause SSRF without logging in, attack intranet
IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses bypass SSRF protection in validateUrlSync(), enabling full SSRF for SDK embedders
AI Threat Alert