AI Threat AlertLocal Deep Research is Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Download Service
Langflow: SSRF in URL-taking components (protection disabled by default / warn-only, not applied to RSS, SearXNG, Web Search, Home Assistant, Glean, Docling
Atlassian: DNS-rebinding TOCTOU bypass of the SSRF
Atlassian: Incomplete fix for GHSA-7r34-79r5-rcc9: redirect-based SSRF via unhooked requests session in Jira user-permission lookup
Flowise: SSRF Protection Bypass via Direct node-fetch / axios Usage (Patch Enforcement Failure
aborruso/ckan-mcp-server has SSRF via DNS-name → internal IP — incomplete
before 2.34.1 and 2.33.x before 2.33.4 contains an SSRF protection bypass in the SearXNG Agent tool. The tool sent requests to the user-supplied API URL using
PraisonAI: SpiderTools redirect-target SSRF protection bypass
local-deep-research is Vulnerable to HTML Injection via Unescaped
LangChain Text Splitters: HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url SSRF Redirect Bypass
Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.3 Langflow could allow server-side request forgery (SSRF) due to incomplete and ineffective SSRF protection enforcement
Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 Langflow 1.9.0 could allow server-side request forgery (SSRF) due to insecure default configuration and incomplete enforcement of the SSRF protection mechanism
pyLoad: SSRF guard bypass via IPv6 6to4/NAT64 transition wrappers of internal
OpenClaw before 2026.4.29 contains an SSRF policy bypass vulnerability in browser debug and export routes that allows reuse of already-open blocked tabs. Attackers with access to these routes
local-deep-research has an SSRF bypass in `safe
Open WebUI vulnerable to blind server side request forgery (SSRF) via the PDF generate function
OpenClaw: QQBot reply media URL handling could trigger SSRF and re-upload fetched bytes