Paper2611.04461v1
A Security Analysis of Verifiable Credential Verification Pipelines: Attack Surface Arising from JSON-LD/RDFC Canonicalization Compared with SD-JWT VC and mdoc
service (DoS) via poison graphs, context injection through @context, and server-side request forgery (SSRF) reachable via malicious URLs, all at default settings. A poison graph, whose blank-node references
high relevanceattack
Paper2609.29757v1
OllamaDrama: Designing and Deploying a Honeypot to Measure Attacks on Exposed LLM Infrastructure
both the infrastructure and LLM layers. These included model management abuse, path traversal and SSRF probes, RCE and cryptocurrency mining payloads, resource exhaustion attempts, prompt injection, information extraction, and agent
high relevanceattack
Paper2512.14860v1
Penetration Testing of Agentic AI: A Comparative Security Analysis Across Models and Frameworks
system and 13 distinct attack scenarios that span prompt injection, Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF), SQL injection, and tool misuse. Our 130 total test cases reveal significant security disparities: AutoGen
medium relevancetool