Local Deep Research is Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Download Service
Flowise: SSRF Protection Bypass via Direct node-fetch / axios Usage (Patch Enforcement Failure
LangChain Text Splitters: HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url SSRF Redirect Bypass
OpenClaw: QQBot reply media URL handling could trigger SSRF and re-upload fetched bytes
OpenClaw: SSRF via Unguarded `fetch()` in Marketplace Plugin Download and Ollama Model Discovery
powered applications. Prior to version 1.1.8, a redirect-based Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) bypass exists in `RecursiveUrlLoader` in `@langchain/community`. The loader validates the initial URL but allows the underlying
mode=True, is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability stems from the way the StringLookup layer is handled during model loading from
OpenClaw: Existing-session browser interaction routes bypassed SSRF policy enforcement
OpenClaw: Strict browser SSRF bypass in Playwright redirect handling leaves private targets reachable
OpenClaw: Marketplace Plugin Download Follows Redirects Without SSRF Protection
Heartex - Label Studio Community Edition vulnerable to SSRF in the Data Import module
Langflow Desktop 1.0.0 through 1.8.4 IBM Langflow is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading
attacker-controlled server could redirect to internal, localhost, or cloud metadata endpoints, bypassing SSRF protections. The resp
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