Local Deep Research is Vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Download Service
Atlassian: DNS-rebinding TOCTOU bypass of the SSRF
Flowise: SSRF Protection Bypass via Direct node-fetch / axios Usage (Patch Enforcement Failure
PraisonAI: SpiderTools redirect-target SSRF protection bypass
local-deep-research is Vulnerable to HTML Injection via Unescaped
LangChain Text Splitters: HTMLHeaderTextSplitter.split_text_from_url SSRF Redirect Bypass
Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.3 Langflow could allow server-side request forgery (SSRF) due to incomplete and ineffective SSRF protection enforcement
Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.0 Langflow 1.9.0 could allow server-side request forgery (SSRF) due to insecure default configuration and incomplete enforcement of the SSRF protection mechanism
pyLoad: SSRF guard bypass via IPv6 6to4/NAT64 transition wrappers of internal
OpenClaw before 2026.4.29 contains an SSRF policy bypass vulnerability in browser debug and export routes that allows reuse of already-open blocked tabs. Attackers with access to these routes
local-deep-research has an SSRF bypass in `safe
Open WebUI vulnerable to blind server side request forgery (SSRF) via the PDF generate function
OpenClaw: QQBot reply media URL handling could trigger SSRF and re-upload fetched bytes
OpenClaw: SSRF via Unguarded `fetch()` in Marketplace Plugin Download and Ollama Model Discovery
mode=True, is vulnerable to arbitrary local file loading and Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability stems from the way the StringLookup layer is handled during model loading from
Unauthenticated form resolver forwards the privileged Objecten-API token to a caller-supplied URL (SSRF