Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.12.3 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network

Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.12.3 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network

remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability

controlled AI provider URL directly to LiteLLM without applying the server's outbound-request SSRF checks when an authenticated user creates a Space, configures an AI provider with

builder to build websites, blogs or ecommerce stores. Prior to version 1.0.8.6, Vvveb's SSRF guard resolves a host with an IPv4-only function and never inspects IPv6

server-side request forgery vulnerability in browser wait predicates that allows attackers to bypass SSRF protections by reaching blocked destinations. Attackers can use the wait --fn function against an existing

recheck, a trusted hostname that resolves to an unspecified address (0.0.0.0 or ::) bypasses the SSRF destination validation. An attacker who can influence DNS for an allowed hostname can therefore cause

server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability was identified in the notebook viewer of GitHub Enterprise Server. The notebook viewer validated the scheme and host of a user-supplied

Context Protocol (MCP) server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, _make_ssrf_safe_hook is omitted from JiraFetcher and ConfluenceFetcher sessions created through the basic-auth

process_authentication_headers and used to construct Atlassian fetchers without calling validate_url_for_ssrf. A caller who can set these headers can supply an internal or metadata-service

server for Atlassian products (Confluence and Jira). Prior to 0.22.0, validate_url_for_ssrf has a backslash authority confusion because it interprets the authority differently from the Requests connection layer

side request forgery vulnerability in Cheerio, Playwright, and Puppeteer document loader nodes that bypass SSRF protection. Attackers can provide arbitrary URLs to fetch cloud metadata, internal services, and private network

components containing socket or urllib imports. This enables: (1) AWS credential theft via IMDSv1 SSRF with full IAM role permissions, (2) arbitrary file exfiltration from the container filesystem

Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.11.5 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an unauthenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network

Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.11.2 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an authenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network

Langflow OSS 1.0.0 through 1.10.2 is vulnerable to server-side request forgery (SSRF). This may allow an unauthenticated attacker to send unauthorized requests from the system, potentially leading to network

resolving to a loopback, private, link-local, or cloud-metadata address therefore bypasses the SSRF policy without a rebinding race and can expose internal responses to the agent. This issu

remote authenticated attacker to obtain sensitive information due to a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability

exposed to Code and Function nodes. The validation logic checks the uri property for SSRF safety while the underlying HTTP client uses the url property when both are present, allowing

read a local file accessible to the n8n process or fetch an internal URL (SSRF) and attach the result to the outgoing message